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Abstract This paper develops an account of mood selection with attitude predicates
in French. I start by examining the “contextual commitment” account of mood devel-
oped by Portner and Rubinstein (in: Chereches (ed) Proceedings of SALT 22, CLC
Publications, Ithaca, NY, pp 461–487, 2012). A key innovation of Portner and Rubin-
stein’s (P&R’s) account is to treat mood selection as fundamentally depending on
a relation between individuals’ attitudes and the predicate’s modal backgrounds. I
raise challenges for P&R’s qualitative analysis of contextual commitment and expla-
nations of mood selection. There are indicative-selecting predicates that are felicitous
in contexts where there isn’t contextual commitment (in P&R’s sense); and there
are subjunctive-selecting predicates that involve no less contextual commitment (in
P&R’s sense) than certain indicative-selecting verbs. I develop an alternative account
of verbal mood. The general approach, which I call a state-of-mind approach, is to
analyze mood in terms of whether the formal relation between the predicate’s modal
backgrounds and an overall state of mind represents a relation of commitment. Indica-
tive mood in French presupposes that the informational-evaluative state determined
by the predicate’s modal backgrounds is included in the informational-evaluative state
characterizing the event described by the predicate. The account provides an improved
explanation of core mood-selection puzzles, including subjunctive-selection with emo-
tive factives, indicative-selection with fiction verbs, indicative-selection with espérer
‘hope’ versus subjunctive-selection with vouloir ‘want’, and indicative-selection with
commissives versus subjunctive-selection with directives. Subjunctive-selection with
modal adjectives is briefly considered. The mood-selection properties of the predicates
B Alex Silk
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are derived from the proposed analysis of mood, independently attested features of
the predicates’ semantics, and general principles of interpretation.
Keywords Mood · Mood selection · Modality · Events · Context-sensitivity · Attitude
ascriptions
1 Introduction
This paper examines the semantics and pragmatics of verbal mood selection. I focus
on the factors affecting the selection of indicative versus subjunctive mood in the
complements of attitude verbs and speech-act verbs in French, as in (1)–(2).
(1) Indicative-selecting verb:
a. Alice
Alice
croit
thinks
que
that
Blanche
Blanche
est
is.IND
végétarienne.
vegetarian
b. *Alice
Alice
croit
thinks
que
that
Blanche
Blanche
soit
is.SBJV
végétarienne.
vegetarian
(2) Subjunctive-selecting verb:
a. *Alice
Alice
veut
wants
que
that
Blanche
Blanche
est
is.IND
végétarienne.
vegetarian
b. Alice
Alice
veut
wants
que
that
Blanche
Blanche
soit
is.SBJV
végétarienne.
vegetarian
A common approach is to explain the contrast between indicative- versus subjunctive-
selecting attitude predicates in terms of a notion of commitment:1 Attitude ascriptions
with indicative complements express judgments of truth, whether according to the atti-
tude subject or the speaker (Bolinger 1968; Noonan 1985; Palmer 1986; Farkas 1992,
2003; Giannakidou 1999; Schlenker 2005; Marques 2009; Siegel 2009; Smirnova
2011; Anand and Hacquard 2013); they describe attitudes that are “prototypically
factive” (Portner 1997). Attitude ascriptions with subjunctive complements lack such
a commitment (Schlenker 2005; Siegel 2009): they evaluate the complement not by
assessing its truth, but by comparing it to a set of alternatives (Farkas 1992, 2003;
Giannakidou 1999; Giorgi and Pianesi 1997; Villalta 2000, 2008; Marques 2009;
Anand and Hacquard 2013); they describe “non-representational” attitudes (Bolinger
1968), like preferences.
Details of implementation aside, treating mood selection in terms of commitment
to the embedded proposition captures many examples well. It captures the selection
of the indicative with predicates of acceptance (croire ‘believe’, savoir ‘know’) and
assertion (dire ‘say’), as in (1) and (3). And it captures the selection of the subjunctive
with desideratives such as vouloir ‘want’ and directives (ordonner ‘order’), as in (2)
and (4).
1 I will often use ‘attitude’ broadly to cover predicates describing mental states and speech acts.
123
Commitment and states of mind with mood and modality
(3) Alice
Alice
a dit
said
que
that
Blanche
Blanche
est/*soit
is.IND/*is.SBJV
végétarienne.
vegetarian
(4) Alice
Alice
a ordonné
ordered
que
that
Blanche
Blanche
soit/*est
is.SBJV/*is.IND
végétarienne.
vegetarian
But there are well-known puzzle cases. Portner and Rubinstein (2012) provide a cru-
cial advance in systematizing these cases and diagnosing the challenges raised for
previous theories. Notably, first, uses of emotive factives (‘regret’, ‘be happy’) imply
commitment to the embedded proposition, at least by the attitude subject if not also
by the speaker. Yet emotive factives contrast with non-emotive factives in typically
requiring subjunctive in French, as reflected in (5)–(6).
(5) Alice
Alice
est
is
heureuse
happy
que
that
Blanche
Blanche
soit/*est
is.SBJV/*is.IND
végétarienne.
vegetarian
(6) Alice
Alice
sait
knows
que
that
Blanche
Blanche
est/*soit
is.IND/*is.SBJV
végétarienne.
vegetarian
On the flip side, fiction verbs (‘imagine’, ‘dream’) needn’t imply any doxastic com-
mitment, and yet they select indicative, as in (7) with rêver ‘dream’.
(7) Alice
Alice
a rêvé
dreamed
que
that
Blanche
Blanche
était/*fût
was.IND/*was.SBJV
végétarienne.
vegetarian
Further, although many desire verbs select subjunctive, as in (2) with vouloir, others,
such as espérer ‘hope’, select indicative:
(8) Alice
Alice
espère
hopes
que
that
Blanche
Blanche
est/*soit
is.IND/*is.SBJV
végétarienne.
vegetarian
And whereas directives select subjunctive, as in (4) with ordonner, commissives select
indicative, as in (9) with promettre ‘promise’.
(9) Alice
Alice
promet
promises
que
that
Blanche
Blanche
est/*soit
is.IND/*is.SBJV
végétarienne.
vegetarian
Portner and Rubinstein appeal to the contrasts in mood selection among desidera-
tives and between commissives versus directives in arguing against what they call
the “proto-standard analysis of mood”—roughly, the view that subjunctive-selecting
verbs are precisely those verbs with a comparative semantics. Whatever might dis-
tinguish ‘hope’/‘promise’, on the one hand, and ‘want’/‘order’, on the other, it seems
unlikely to be that the latter have a semantics involving an evaluative comparison of
alternatives while the former do not.
In sum, we have the following mood-selection puzzles to explain (cf. Portner and
Rubinstein 2012):
– subjunctive-selection with emotive factives,
– indicative-selection with fiction verbs,
– indicative-selection with espérer versus subjunctive-selection with vouloir,
– indicative-selection with commissives versus subjunctive-selection with directives.
123
A. Silk
Why do some attitude verbs implying doxastic commitment select indicative, while
others select subjunctive? Why do desire verbs like vouloir select subjunctive, while
espérer and fiction verbs select indicative? Why does reporting obligations created
with directives require subjunctive, while reporting obligations created with promises
requires indicative?
Much progress has been made on these questions. The “commitment-based”
approach to mood, as I called it, is in fact a family of approaches. The central aims of
this paper are twofold: first, to raise challenges for Portner and Rubinstein’s (2012)
“contextual commitment” account of mood and diagnosis of mood-selection puzzles
such as those above; second, to introduce a novel strategy for exploiting a notion
of commitment in an account of verbal mood. The proposed state-of-mind approach
provides an improved treatment of the above puzzle cases.
Roadmap: Section 2 explains Portner and Rubinstein’s contextual commitment
account of mood and its improvements on previous accounts. Section 3 raises empirical
and conceptual challenges for Portner and Rubinstein’s account. Section 4 develops
the alternative state-of-mind account of verbal mood and applies the account to the
relevant cases of mood selection in French. Section 5 compares the proposed account
to certain others in the literature. Section 6 concludes.
A more detailed overview of the paper is as follows. I start by examining Portner
and Rubinstein’s (“P&R’s”) contextual commitment account of verbal mood (Sect. 2).
P&R’s discussion provides a crucial contribution to our understanding of the semantics
and pragmatics of mood and modality. A key innovation is to analyze mood selection
in terms of a relation between the commitments of the participants in the reported
attitude/speech event and the parameters used in the modal evaluation of the clause.
Mood selection is explained, not in terms of commitment to the truth of the verb’s
complement, but in terms of commitment to the verb’s modal backgrounds—i.e., to the
beliefs, preferences, obligations, etc. which figure in the verb’s semantics. Indicative-
selecting attitude verbs, on P&R’s view, presuppose that all “relevant individuals are
prepared to defend the modal background of the attitude as being reasonable and
appropriate” (2012: 462). This view makes room for indicative-selecting verbs such
as espérer or promettre with a preference-based comparative semantics. Very roughly:
espérer ‘hope’, unlike vouloir ‘want’, presupposes that the subject is committed to the
relevant desires (and beliefs); and commissives, unlike directives, presuppose that the
subject and object are both committed to the obligation—hence indicative-selection
with espérer and promettre, and subjunctive-selection with vouloir and ordonner. Or
so P&R argue.
Section 3 argues that P&R’s analysis of contextual commitment and explanations
of mood selection are problematic. There are indicative-selecting predicates that are
felicitous in contexts where there isn’t contextual commitment (in P&R’s sense); and
there are subjunctive-selecting predicates that involve no less contextual commitment
(in P&R’s sense) than certain indicative-selecting predicates. It isn’t commitment
to the contents of modal backgrounds—commitment to the reasonableness of the
information or priorities—that explains differences in mood selection.
Section 4 develops an alternative commitment-based account of verbal mood.
P&R’s strategy is to offer a qualitative notion of commitment and explain mood
selection in terms of whether relevant individuals are “committed,” in the qualita-
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tively defined sense, to the predicate’s modal backgrounds. In contrast, I suggest that
we understand mood selection in terms of whether the formal relation between the
verb’s modal parameters and a relevant state of mind represents a relation of commit-
ment.2 Mood is analyzed directly in terms of a relation between a predicate’s modal
backgrounds and an overall state of mind. I call this general approach a state-of-mind
approach to mood.
I propose that indicative mood in French presupposes that the predicate’s modal
backgrounds are “live” (in a manner to be made precise) from the perspective of the
state of mind characterizing the event described by the predicate. States of mind can
include doxastic and practical aspects (e.g. beliefs, preferences). Indicative-selecting
predicates “presuppose commitment” in the sense of presupposing that the modal state
with respect to which the complement is evaluated is implied by the informational-
evaluative state characterizing the local attitude/discourse event. These ideas are given
a precise formal implementation. Enriching our understanding of states of mind, and
refining our treatments of context and content accordingly, helps provide an improved
explanation of our mood-selection puzzles. Patterns of mood selection are derived
from the proposed account of mood, independently attested features of the verbs’
semantics, and general principles of interpretation.
Two remarks on the scope of the paper: First, I focus only on mood marking
in French; specifically, on mood marking in complement clauses of attitude verbs;
and, more specifically, on cases of mood selection, in which a particular mood is
required in the complement clause. There are interesting questions to be asked about
crosslinguistic variations in verbal mood, about mood marking in other linguistic
contexts (e.g., root clauses, relative clauses, adjuncts), and about interpretive effects
of using indicative versus subjunctive with predicates that can embed either mood. I
leave it to future research to investigate how the account in this paper may be extended
to mood marking in other languages and linguistic environments.
Second, an important contribution of P&R’s discussion is to introduce data with
modal adjectives (possible, probable, nécessaire) into the theory of mood. I largely
set these adjectives aside. Ongoing contextualism/relativism/expressivism debates and
debates about graded modality highlight independently contentious issues regarding
how the modal parameters are to be represented in the formal semantics, how the
context-sensitivity of epistemic normative/evaluative readings is to be implemented,
and how the modal backgrounds are determined as a function of context.3 Focusing on
attitude and speech-act verbs, whose modal backgrounds are lexically specified as a
function of individual arguments, allows us to abstract away from confounding issues
regarding the context-sensitivity and modal backgrounds of P&R’s modal adjectives.
The verbs under consideration highlight the central mood-selection issues and the
core challenges for previous theories such as P&R’s. I return to modal adjectives in
Sect. 4.4.
2 Thanks to a referee for suggesting this way of situating the account in comparison to P&R’s.
3 See e.g. Stephenson (2007), Yalcin (2007), von Fintel and Gillies (2010), Lassiter (2011, 2015), Kratzer
(2012), MacFarlane (2014), Silk (2016, 2017, 2018), and Swanson (2016).
123
A. Silk
2 Portner and Rubinstein’s contextual commitment account of mood
This section examines Portner and Rubinstein’s (P&R’s) contextual commitment
account of verbal mood. I begin with relevant formal background.
Following much semantically-oriented work on mood, P&R use a broadly Kratze-
rian (1981, 1991) framework in giving the semantics of attitude predicates. Modal
expressions are interpreted with respect to two modal backgrounds, or functions from
worlds to sets of propositions. Given an evaluation world w, these modal backgrounds
determine a modal base f (w) that represents a body of information, and an ordering
source g(w) that represents a body of priorities (norms, values, goals, etc.). What
modal backgrounds are supplied may depend on context, as with many modal auxil-
iaries, or be determined by the lexical semantics, as with attitude verbs. For instance,
a doxastic attitude verb such as croire ‘believe’ takes a modal base that represents the
subject’s beliefs.
Whereas modal bases must be consistent and include the evaluation world, i.e.
∀w : w ∈ ⋂ f (w), ordering sources needn’t have either of these properties. An order-
ing source g(w) can be used to generate a preorder on the set of worlds in the modal
base
(⋂ f (w),g(w)
)
or on a set of alternative propositions
(
C,≤g(w)
)
.
4 What P&R
call the “proto-standard analysis of mood” treats subjunctive-selecting predicates as
those which take a non-empty ordering source, leading to a comparative semantics—
as reflected in the first-pass semantics for vouloir ‘want’ in (10), in contrast to the
semantics for croire ‘believe’ in (11).
(10) x vouloir pw = 1 iff p <DESx,w ¬p
(11) x croire pw = 1 iff ⋂ DOXx,w ⊆ p
As P&R observe, indicative-taking verbs such as espérer ‘hope’ and promettre
‘promise’ pose a challenge for such a view. Espérer would presumably be like vouloir
‘want’ in taking a bouletic ordering source DES that represents the subject’s desires;
and promettre would presumably be like ordonner ‘order’ in taking a deontic ordering
source OBL that represents the subject’s obligations. A defender of the proto-standard
theory might respond by treating DES/OBL as modal bases with indicative-taking
verbs, presupposing that the relevant desires/obligations are consistent. This would
lead to a non-comparative semantics like (12) for espérer. Yet saying this undermines
the predictiveness of the account. As P&R note, any non-comparative semantics can be
reformulated in a comparative way, as in (13) for croire, letting DOXx,w be a premise
4 The preorder on worlds g(w) can be generated from the premise set g(w) in the usual way: for any
worlds u, v, u g(w) v := ∀p ∈ g(w) : v ∈ p ⇒ u ∈ p. How the order on propositions is generated won’t
be important for our purposes (cf. Kratzer 1991, 2012; Lassiter 2015). One might read ‘p <g(w) ¬p’ as
saying that for every ¬p-world in ⋂ f (w), there is a p-world in ⋂ f (w) that satisfies a (possibly improper)
superset of propositions in g(w), and not vice versa. With attitude verbs, the modal backgrounds may
take an individual argument in addition to a world argument. I often include only a world argument when
talking about modal bases and ordering sources in general. For ease of exposition I sometimes use ‘modal
base’/‘ordering source’ for the modal background h, sometimes for the set of propositions h(w), and, with
modal bases, sometimes for the set of worlds
⋂
h(w) in which these propositions are true; context should
disambiguate.
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set that represents the ideal of approximating x’s doxastic state of mind (cf. Bittner
2011).
(12) x espérer pw = 1 iff ⋂ DESx,w ⊆ p
(13) x croire pw = 1 iff p <DOXx,w ¬p
(cf. Portner and Rubinstein 2012: 468–469)
Indeed, minimality semantics are commonplace in literatures on belief change and
updating (cf. Makinson 1993). Absent an independent account of what type of modal
background a body of desires, beliefs, obligations, etc. provides in different cases,
appealing to a comparative semantics is insufficiently explanatory.
To avoid this problem P&R treat mood selection in terms of commitment to the
modal backgrounds associated with the attitude predicate. P&R define the relevant
notion of commitment as follows, drawing on Rubinstein (2012) (see also Rubinstein
2014; Portner and Rubinstein 2016). (P&R follow Hacquard 2006 in treating modal
backgrounds as relativized to events, as opposed to worlds; more on this in Sect. 4.)
(14) Commitment to modal backgrounds (P&R)
“An individual a is committed to a modal background h in event e iff a
is disposed/prepared in e to argue for h(e) in a conversationally appropriate
way (e.g., by arguing that it is rational/proper/sensible/wise) in any relevant
conversation c.”
(Portner and Rubinstein 2012: ex. (40))
One is “committed to a modal background” (modal base, ordering source), in P&R’s
sense, iff one treats its content (2012: 475)—the information, preferences, etc.—as
“reasonable” and one is “willing to defend it” (2012: 471). What distinguishes indica-
tive from subjunctive mood, on P&R’s account, is a presupposition of contextual
commitment: Indicative presupposes that every individual argument of the predicate
is committed (in the sense of (14)) to every modal background associated with the
predicate.5 Subjunctive lacks such a presupposition; it has no semantic effect.
P&R argue that the defined qualitative notion of commitment explains the con-
trasting mood-selection properties of otherwise notionally similar predicates: in each
case, P&R’s diagnosis is that the indicative-selecting predicate presupposes contex-
tual commitment, and the analogous subjunctive-selecting predicate does not. Take
espérer ‘hope’ and vouloir ‘want’. P&R note that the speaker in (15) can report the
king’s desire using ‘want’ but not ‘hope’. (For expository purposes I sometimes use
the English expression for the item crosslinguistically.)6
(15) [Context: The king is being bothered by an uppity bishop and makes his
annoyance known to some knights. These knights go and kill the bishop, and
5 Note that what P&R’s commitment condition requires is (i) a disposition to argue (not necessarily an
actual argument), (ii) that the disposition holds in e (in the reported event described by the predicate, not
necessarily in the speech/evaluation event), and (iii) that this disposition in e is to argue in any relevant c
(cf. Portner and Rubinstein 2012: 478). We will return to these components.
6 I assume with P&R, following Iatridou (2000), that conditional mood is a form of the indicative.
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when the king hears about it, he is angry because it makes him look bad with
the church. The knights respond with (a) or (b).]
a. Mais vous vouliez qu’il soit tué!
but you wanted that he be.SBJV killed
‘But you wanted him to be killed!’
b. ?? Mais vous espériez qu’il serait/est tué!
but you hoped that he be.COND.IND/is.IND killed
?? ‘But you hoped for him to be killed!’
(Portner and Rubinstein 2012: ex. (25))
Contextual commitment provides a diagnosis: The ‘hope’-ascription presupposes that
the subject (=the king) is committed to his desire for the bishop to be killed. Using
‘hope’ is anomalous insofar as the king isn’t prepared to defend this desire as rea-
sonable in the conversation. By using ‘want’ the speaker can report the king’s desire
without implying that the king is committed to it. So, since espérer ‘hope’ presupposes
contextual commitment, it selects indicative; since vouloir ‘want’ doesn’t presuppose
contextual commitment, it selects subjunctive.
Similarly, P&R claim that although ‘promise’ and ‘order’ both report creations of
obligations, they differ with respect to contextual commitment. With promising, “the
promiser and promisee must see the thing promised as preferable”; yet with ordering,
“the person ordered need not think what they are ordered to do is preferable” (2012:
473). Consider (16)–(17).
(16) Marie
Marie
a
has
promis
promised
à
to
Bill
Bill
qu’elle
that she
amènerait
bring.COND.IND
le
the
dessert
dessert
à
to
la
the
fête.
party
‘Mary promised Bill to bring dessert to the party.’
(17) Marie
Marie
a
has
demandé
demanded
à
to
Bill
Bill
qu’il
that he
amène
bring.SBJV
le
the
dessert
dessert
à
to
la
the
fête.
party
‘Mary ordered Bill to bring dessert to the party.’
(Portner and Rubinstein 2012: exs. (29)–(30))
In promising Bill that she will bring dessert, Mary “proposes to bind [herself] with a
priority, and [Bill] has no grounds for disputing this” (2012: 473). Hence in promise
reports such as (16) there is contextual commitment to the priority—both subject
and object are prepared to defend it—and promettre selects indicative. By contrast,
if Mary orders Bill to bring dessert, “the priority [of Bill’s bringing dessert] may be
controversial, …and [Bill] may dispute it” (2012: 473). Hence in order reports such
as (17) there needn’t be contextual commitment to the priority—the object needn’t be
prepared to defend it—and ordonner selects subjunctive.
(This last move is too quick: What about uses of ordonner where the object judges
that what is ordered of him/her is appropriate? Or uses of vouloir where the subject
is prepared to defend her desires as reasonable? P&R explain the fact that indicative
still cannot be used in such contexts by positing that, because the contextual commit-
ment condition isn’t in general satisfied, the lexical items have become grammatically
associated with subjunctive (2012: 481). We will return to this issue throughout the
following sections.)
123
Commitment and states of mind with mood and modality
3 Challenges
This section raises challenges for P&R’s contextual commitment account of mood.
For clarity let’s use ‘commitmentPR’ for commitment in P&R’s sense, as analyzed in
(14): a is committedPR to a modal background h in e iff for all propositions p ∈ h(e), a
is prepared to defend that p is “reasonable” or “rational/proper/sensible/wise” in any
relevant conversation. Likewise let’s say that a is committedPR to a given proposition
p in e iff a is prepared to defend that p is reasonable, etc. in any relevant conversation
(i.e. iff for some h such that p ∈ h(e), a is committedPR to h in e, as for the trivial case
where h(e) = {p}). The general concern is that this intuitive notion of commitment
isn’t fit to explain the full range of data. Contextual commitmentPR fails to delineate
the classes of indicative- and subjunctive-selecting predicates.
3.1 Desideratives and doxastics
P&R offer the following additional contrasts between ‘hope’ and ‘want’:
(18) a. He doesn’t fully realize it yet, but Ron wants to date Hermione.
b. ?? He doesn’t fully realize it yet, but Ron hopes to date Hermione.
(19) a. I want to marry Alice and I want to marry Sue.
b. ?? I hope to marry Alice and I hope to marry Sue.
(Portner and Rubinstein 2012: exs. (26)–(27))
P&R cite (18)–(19) as evidence against accounts which claim that what distinguishes
‘hope’ from ‘want’ is that ‘hope’ requires that the subject believe the complement to be
possible: using ‘hope’ in (18b)/(19b) is infelicitous even though the subject believes the
complement is possible. Instead P&R claim that using ‘hope’ is infelicitous because
the subject isn’t committedPR to the relevant preferences: (18b) is infelicitous since
“commitment to a preference, in the relevant sense, requires being aware of it,” and
(19b) is infelicitous “since it is impossible to be committed to inconsistent preferences”
(2012: 471–472). These explanations are problematic.
Consider (19). Pace P&R, it is possible to be committed, in the sense of (14),
to conflicting preferences. CommitmentPR to conflicting preferences simply requires
that the subject be prepared to defend each preference as “reasonable and appropriate”
(2012: 462) in any relevant conversation. One can imagine our torn lover in (19) saying,
“It would be reasonable for me to marry Alice. We have such deep conversations, and
we’ve been through so much together. Yet it’s Sue that I can’t stop thinking about. It
would be reasonable for me to marry her, too. I adore each of them, and I’m sure I
would be happy either way. What to do!” Such a state of mind might incur a practical
conflict, but it isn’t impossible.
Note the contrast with belief. Even if it is possible to have inconsistent beliefs, it
is impossible to have inconsistent beliefs which are all correct, i.e. true (Stalnaker
1984). Correctness for preferences isn’t truth but desirability; roughly put, a prefer-
ence is correct if its content is genuinely valuable or worth satisfying (e.g., Gibbard
1990, 2005; Piller 2006). As dilemmas with incomparable preferences (values, norms,
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etc.) highlight, accepting inconsistent priorities might not only be possible but correct
(Gowans 1987; Sinnott-Armstrong 1988; Goble 2013).
P&R’s treatment of (18b) raises problems for their treatment of croire ‘believe’.
Croire is like espérer in selecting indicative. However, examples analogous to (18b)
with ‘believe’ can be felicitous. (20) reports Bert’s implicit beliefs about women.7
(20) [Context: Bert consciously judges that women are equally capable as men in
the workplace, but he is also implicitly biased against women. A psychologist
examining Bert’s results in an implicit attitudes experiment says:]
Bert doesn’t fully realize it yet, but he thinks that women are less capable than
men in the workplace, and that their proper place is in the home.
Reporting Bert’s implicit attitudes with ‘believe’ is felicitous even though Bert isn’t
aware of them and isn’t disposed to defend them—indeed, even though Bert is disposed
to sincerely deny them. It is interesting that in Williamson’s classic discussions of
failures of transparency, his paradigm cases are precisely belief and hope:
[O]ne is sometimes in no position to know whether one is in the mental state
of hoping p. I believe that I do not hope for a particular result to a match; I am
conscious of nothing but indifference; then my disappointment at one outcome
reveals my hope for another… [Transparency] fails for the state of believing
p, for the difference between believing p and merely fancying p depends in
part on one’s dispositions to practical reasoning and action manifested only in
counterfactual circumstances, and one is not always in a position to know what
those dispositions are. (Williamson 2000: 24)
Williamson’s hoper isn’t prepared to defend the preferability of such-and-such team’s
winning in any relevant conversation; for all he would say, he is indifferent. Exam-
ples like (18b) with ‘hope’ improve insofar as context makes clear one’s grounds for
attributing the implicit attitudes to the subject, as in (21)–(22).
(21) TW hoped the Giants would win, but he didn’t fully realize it at the time.
(22) [Context: Same as (20)]
Bert doesn’t fully realize it yet, but he hopes his wife doesn’t end up getting
the job, so that she can stay home with the kids.
P&R might respond that cases of implicit attitudes, failures of transparency, etc. are
exceptional enough so as to be ignored by the language faculty. At minimum, the felic-
ity of the sorts of examples in (20)–(22) challenges the explanatoriness of accounting
for indicative-selection in terms of commitmentPR to modal backgrounds (more on
which below).
P&R distinguish ‘want’ and ‘hope’ partly in terms of the kinds of preferences
they describe. ‘Want’ describes “visceral,” “glandular” preferences; ‘hope’ describes
7 Cf.: “What is happening here, I think, is that he’s [my husband is] revealing what he doesn’t realize
he believes: that I’m only doing what I should be doing anyway, whereas he is doing something special,
something that isn’t really his job to do.” (www.swistle.com/2006/09).
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“intellectual” preferences (2012: 471). Since “one cannot help one’s glandular-buletic
preferences…, there’s no guarantee they will be defensible” (2012: 479)—hence
subjunctive-selection with vouloir. These remarks are in tension with P&R’s account
of indicative-selection with croire. Belief is also often not up to us. Consider your
present occurrent belief that you are reading a paper. Here is Plantinga:
You ask me what I had for breakfast: I find myself believing that what I had for
breakfast was a grapefruit. I am appeared to redly; I find myself with the belief
that I am perceiving something red… In each of these cases (as in general), I
have little or no direct or conscious control. (Plantinga 1993: 177)
Debates in philosophy and psychology have concerned whether any beliefs are vol-
untary (Alston 1988; Bennett 1990).
P&R might reply that even if we “cannot help” having many of our beliefs, we are
still typically prepared to defend them. Examples such as (23)–(24) are perhaps the
exception rather than the rule.
(23) [Context: Same as (20)]
Bert thinks that women are less capable than men in the workplace, but he
would deny it if you asked him.
(24) Fideist: I believe that God exists. I have no arguments; indeed my belief may
even be contrary to reason. But I can’t help but believe, any more than you
can help believing that you are reading this example.
Likewise for (25) with ‘hope’.
(25) TW hopes the Giants will win, but he would deny it if you asked him.
The exceptionality of such examples might warrant treating croire and espérer as
lexically associated with indicative, and hence as licensing indicative even when the
commitmentPR presupposition isn’t satisfied. Although P&R speculate that grammati-
calized mood may only occur with subjunctive-selecting predicates—as mentioned in
Sect. 2 with vouloir and ordonner (2012: 481–482)—perhaps P&R might treat croire
and espérer as cases of grammaticalized indicative.
Appealing to grammaticalization in these ways for the paradigm indicative-
selecting and subjunctive-selecting predicates threatens the explanatory and predictive
power of P&R’s commitment-based semantic definition of mood. It is incorrect that the
contextual commitmentPR presupposition “is guaranteed to be satisfied [with croire],
in virtue of the nature of believing events,” or that the presupposition “would not typi-
cally be satisfied [with vouloir], in virtue of the nature of wanting events” (2012: 477).
We are typically prepared to defend our preferences as well as our beliefs; conversely,
we sometimes have beliefs as well as preferences which we wouldn’t defend. Given
P&R’s contextual commitment account, one could just as easily have speculated (e.g.)
that croire would be lexically associated with subjunctive. To parrot P&R’s remark
quoted above (p. 479), “One cannot help one’s beliefs, and because of this, there’s no
guarantee they will be defensible. Nevertheless, we may want to describe them, so a
verb like ‘believe’ is essential.” I don’t deny that some degree of grammaticalization
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is involved in mood selection, or that grammaticalization can be arbitrary (cf. Palmer
1977: 21). The question is whether specific choices in matters of mood selection are
best explained in terms of contextual commitmentPR.
P&R’s treatment of espérer versus vouloir raises questions about mood selection
with emotive factives (e.g., regretter ‘regret’, être heureux ‘be happy’). Uses of emo-
tive factives imply that the subject believes the complement, and thus presumably
that the subject is committedPR to the modal base that entails it. Further there doesn’t
seem to be anything necessarily “visceral” or “glandular” about the relevant pref-
erences. The attitudes described by emotive factives don’t in general seem any less
“intellectual” than those described by espérer ‘hope’. Yet emotive factives generally
select subjunctive in French. It isn’t obvious how to explain this simply in terms of
dispositions to defend modal backgrounds.
3.2 Commissives and directives
P&R explain the contrasting mood-selection properties of promettre ‘promise’ and
ordonner ‘order’ in terms of whether the verb’s object need be committedPR to
the deontic ordering source: whereas both the promisor and the promisee must be
committedPR to what is promised, the object of an order needn’t be committedPR to
what is ordered; hence promettre selects indicative, and ordonner selects subjunctive.
Start with P&R’s account of promising. P&R follow Searle in treating it as a nec-
essary condition on promising that the promisee view what is promised as preferable;
in order for X to promise Y that Z, Y must find it preferable that Z (2012: 473). Note
that in order for the contextual commitment presupposition to be satisfied, it isn’t
sufficient that the promisor believe that the promisee would view what is promised
as preferable; the promisee, as the object of promettre, must actually view what is
promised as preferable. An act doesn’t count as a promise unless the promisor and
promisee are each committedPR to the priority.8
There are well-known difficulties for this view about the nature of promising (e.g.
Grant 1949; Harnish 1990; Lauer 2013). First, there are cases in which one erroneously
believes that the promisee has an interest in what is promised, as in (26).
(26) Clara promised her dying father that she would spread his ashes over the Seine,
not realizing that he actually wanted them spread over the Saône.
Intuitively, Clara didn’t merely try or intend to make a promise to her father; she
actually did. In promises as threats the promisor even knows that the promisee wouldn’t
defend the priority, as in (27).
(27) David promised his sister that he would make her life miserable.
It is precisely in making the promise—in committing to a course of action that his
sister disprefers—that David threatens his sister. There may even be cases in which
the subject of the promise doesn’t view what is promised as preferable, as in (28).
8 I use ‘promisor’ and ‘promisee’ both in the successful cases, where the intended promise is made, and
in the unsuccessful cases, where the act doesn’t count as a promise.
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(28) I promised the terrorist that I would kill the other hostages if he held off his
plan for ten minutes. But I knew that the police were on their way, and that it
would never come to that. I would never do such a thing.
The subject in (28) isn’t “prepared to defend” the preferability of killing the hostages
in any conversation.9, 10
P&R might reply that examples such as (26)–(28) are exceptional cases of promis-
ing. P&R might posit that insofar as the contextual commitmentPR condition is
generally satisfied with promettre—or at least generally satisfied in paradigm cases
of promising—promettre has become lexically associated with indicative mood. As
with ‘believe’ and ‘hope’ in Sect. 3.1, such a move weakens the predictiveness of the
account. It might be that in paradigm cases of promising both the subject and object are
committedPR to what is promised, and so it might not be surprising to find languages
such as French that lexicalize indicative with commissives. However, unlike ‘believe’
and ‘hope’, indicative-selection with commissives such as ‘promise’ is crosslinguis-
tically robust. One is left wondering why some languages wouldn’t treat the types
of promises in (26)–(27), if not also (28), as relevant to mood selection. The positive
account in Sect. 4 derives indicative-selection with commissives without assuming that
contentious substantive assumptions about the nature of promising have been encoded
in the conventional meaning across languages.
Now turn to P&R’s claims about the differences between promising and ordering
vis-à-vis contextual commitmentPR. There are two issues here which aren’t delineated
in P&R’s discussion (2012: 472–473, 480–481): (i) whether, upon performance of the
utterance, it need be presupposed that the subject and object are prepared to defend
the priority as preferable; and (ii) whether, upon performance of the utterance, the
promise or order is “automatically in effect” (2012: 473), i.e. whether the priority
is automatically added to the deontic ordering source. Neither way of understanding
9 Native French speakers in an Amazon Mechanical Turk task uniformly translated examples such as
(26)–(28) with indicative, as in (i) (see footnote 6). Likewise for examples such as (20) with croire; for (22)
with espérer, all participants but one used indicative. Thanks to an anonymous referee.
(i) David
David
a
has
promis
promised
à
to
sa
his
soeur
sister
qu’il
that he
rendrait
make.COND.IND
sa
her
vie
life
misérable.
miserable
10 A reviewer asks whether P&R might address some of the counterexamples by weakening the com-
mitment presupposition to a presupposition that the individual arguments have a disposition to defend
the relevant propositions in the reported event e, rather than in any relevant conversation c. However, the
commitment presupposition is about what the individuals are disposed in the reported event e to do. The
weakened presupposition—that the individuals are disposed in e to defend the propositions p ∈ h(e) in
e—is still violated in contexts like (26)/(28) where the speaker knows that one of the individuals didn’t have
such a disposition in e. Could the presupposition be revised further, to require that every individual argument
presuppose in e that every individual argument is (would be?) disposed in e to defend the proposition in
e? In (26), although Clara’s father wasn’t actually prepared to defend the ashes-in-the-Seine priority, Clara
assumed when making the promise (in e) that he was; likewise for (28). However, first, neither revised
condition helps with examples such as (27) or non-transparency examples like (20)–(22) from Sect. 3.1
(see also the examples below with directives and permettre, and (36)–(38) with fiction verbs). Second, the
revised conditions lead to problems with certain of P&R’s core examples. For instance, P&R’s explanation
of the infelicity of espérer ‘hope’ in (15) turns on the fact that the king isn’t prepared in the speech event
e∗—an event presumably among the “relevant” conversations—to defend his earlier desire for the bishop
to be killed.
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contextual commitmentPR captures the mood-selection contrasts between commis-
sives and directives.
P&R are correct that one can be ordered to do something that one doesn’t think is
preferable. So, on the one hand, if P&R take the relevant sense of commitmentPR to be
as in (i), I agree that ‘order’ doesn’t presuppose contextual commitmentPR. However,
as illustrated above, neither does ‘promise’.
On the other hand, if P&R take the relevant sense of commitmentPR to be as in
(ii), it is no longer clear that directives don’t presuppose contextual commitmentPR.
Following Portner’s seminal work, imperatives are often treated as directly updating
the addressee’s To-do List, the set of acts she is contextually committed to performing
(Portner 2004, 2007; cf. Ninan 2005; Portner 2009; Charlow 2011). This view is taken
to capture the oft-observed anomalousness of sentences such as (29).
(29) a. Leave! — #even though I know you won’t.
b. #Mary must leave now, but I know she won’t. (Portner 2009: 190)
Felicitously using an imperative commits the addressee to the priority in the sense of
committing her to (intending to) satisfy it, at least for purposes of conversation. In
Portner’s and Rubinstein’s broader work, imperatives and strong necessity modals are
explicitly treated as presupposing contextual commitmentPR (Rubinstein 2012, 2014;
Portner and Rubinstein 2016). But if directive verbs report issuances of directives and
themselves issue directives in performative uses, it is unclear why they would differ
from other directive constructions with respect to contextual commitmentPR.
Parallel concerns arise for predicates such as permettre ‘permit’. On the one hand,
‘permit’ would seem to be like ‘promise’ in that the permitter and permittee typically
both regard what is permitted to be of value to the permittee. One usually permits
people do things they would want to do, as in (30). Examples such as (31) are typically
anomalous.
(30) Elaine’s mother permitted her to go to the party.
(31) #I permit you to go to the library, but I know you don’t want to.
On the other hand, there are cases in which the subject or object of ‘permit’ (like
‘promise’) doesn’t find what is permitted to be preferable, as in (32)–(33).
(32) [Context: Elaine wants to go to the party later, instead of visiting her grand-
mother like she said she would. Elaine’s mother would prefer that she Elaine
not go to the party.]
Elaine’s mother permitted her to go to the party, but it was really a test to see
if Elaine would choose on her own to visit her grandmother.
(33) She permitted him to stay for dessert, not realizing that he was already full
and wanted to leave the table.
What, then, would P&R predict about the mood-selection properties of permettre?
Would they treat examples like (30) as the norm and predict that permettre (grammat-
ically) selects indicative, as with promettre? Or would they predict that “because the
commitment condition… is not in general satisfied” with permettre, in light of exam-
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ples like (32)–(33), permettre grammatically selects subjunctive, as with ordonner?
(In fact permettre patterns with ordonner in selecting subjunctive.)
3.3 Fiction verbs
Fiction verbs (‘dream’, ‘imagine’) generally select indicative across languages; French
is no exception. Though P&R don’t discuss indicative-selection with fiction verbs, their
remarks on veridicality suggest an explanation in terms of contextual commitmentPR:
Thinking about the indicative in terms of contextual commitment captures the
persistent intuition in the literature that indicative-selecting attitudes take into
account all the relevant things that an attitude holder takes to be true—be it in
reality, in the context of a dream, or in a conversation (Farkas 1992; Giannaki-
dou 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999; Quer 2001). An attitude holder would defend all
and only those propositions that he or she thinks11 accurately describe the rel-
evant “reality,” and thus there is an overlap between Giannakidou’s notion of
veridicality and contextual commitment to epistemic backgrounds. (Portner and
Rubinstein 2012: 482)
P&R’s response is too quick.
As we have seen, P&R treat indicative as requiring commitment to the specific
content of a modal background; one must be prepared to defend the propositions in
the modal base and ordering source as “rational/proper/sensible/wise” (2012: 475,
477–481).12 It isn’t evident that the subjects of fiction verbs satisfy this condition.
Suppose I imagine a world with unicorns, flying pigs, etc., so that the modal base for
‘imagine’ in (34) includes propositions that there are unicorns, that there are flying
pigs, etc.
(34) J’ai imaginé
I imagined
que
that
les cochons
pigs
volent.
fly.IND
I was not prepared to argue that there are unicorns, that there are flying pigs, etc.
“in any relevant conversation.” I might not even have been prepared to do so while I
was imagining. Yet these are the propositions that “accurately describe the relevant
‘reality’,” i.e. what I was imagining.
11 P&R smuggle in that the subject has a higher-order belief about the content of the modal background.
This doesn’t follow from their analysis as stated. See below.
12 Although P&R are explicit about treating commitmentPR as commitment to the propositions in the
modal base or ordering source, an additional complication arises in cases of uncertainty about the specific
content of a modal background at the evaluation world/event. Suppose one endorses whatever the Pope
demands, but one is unsure what he has actually demanded; or suppose one endorses the CIA’s confidential
evidence in the filing cabinet, but one is unsure what their evidence actually is. One might not be prepared to
defend the specific propositions in fcia(e) or gpope(e) as “rational,” etc., yet one is still intuitively committed
to the modal background representing the CIA’s evidence or the Pope’s demands. P&R might revise the
account of commitmentPR to require having corresponding conditional dispositions, e.g. a disposition to
defend p given that the Pope said !p. Yet this move would undermine their account of the anomalousness
of (18b), where they “assum[e] that commitment to a preference, in the relevant sense, requires being aware
of it” (2012: 471–472).
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It is worth unpacking these points. P&R’s contextual commitment presupposition
requires that “a is disposed/prepared in e to argue for h(e)… in any relevant conver-
sation c” (2012: 477). It is important to be clear about the event in which the subject is
presupposed to be “disposed/prepared to defend” the modal background, and what the
disposition amounts to: one must have a certain disposition in the event e described
by the predicate; the disposition must be to defend such-and-such propositions in any
relevant c. In (34)/(35) the presupposition requires that the subject be prepared in the
event of imagining/dreaming to defend that pigs fly.
(35) Alice
Alice
a rêvé
dreamed
que
that
les cochons
pigs
volent.
fly.IND
Of course one needn’t be prepared to defend that pigs fly in the actual circumstance—an
event of, say, sitting at one’s desk daydreaming, or lying in bed having an uncon-
scious experience, ill-disposed to do much of anything. One could be in a permanent
coma. But note that one needn’t have the “disposition to defend” internal to the dream
(imagining, etc.) either. We can dream that we don’t have dispositions to defend things
happening in our dreams, as in (37)–(38), schematized in (36).
(36) J’ai rêvé/imaginé
I imagined/dreamed
que
that
p.IND
p.IND
et
and
que
that
je
I
n’étais pas
was.IND not
disposé
disposed
à
to
défendre
defend
que
that
p
p
a. ≈ “there was an event e, it was a dreaming/imagining event, of which a
was the agent, the content of which included (inter alia) p, and in which a
wasn’t disposed to defend p”
(37) I dreamed that there were aliens and I didn’t believe that there were and would
deny it forever.
(38) Trump: I had a terrible nightmare: I dreamed that global warming was real
but I wouldn’t stop denying it, right up until the end when it killed us all.
Wilder dreams have been had.
Distinguish (i) commitmentPR, i.e. commitment to the specific content of a modal
background, and (ii) commitment to thinking that a modal background correctly rep-
resents the relevant information or priorities. Could P&R capture indicative-selection
with fiction verbs by revising their account and treating the relevant notion of com-
mitment as commitment in the sense of (ii)? No. Even putting aside examples such as
(36)–(38), such a move excludes by linguistic fiat the possibility of non-transparency
about one’s attitudes (about the speech acts one is involved in, etc.; Sect. 3.1). One
cannot refute Williamson by citing a French grammar. Even if one could, the individual
arguments of subjunctive-selecting verbs satisfy the commitment condition in sense
(ii) as well. The subject of vouloir in (39) may not be prepared to argue that her “glan-
dular preference” for a cigarette is reasonable; she lacks sense-(i) commitmentPR. But
she is prepared to argue that an ordering source which includes the proposition that
she has a cigarette accurately describes her glandular preferences; she has sense-(ii)
commitment.
123
Commitment and states of mind with mood and modality
(39) [Context: You are at your doctor’s office for a checkup. He tells you what bad
shape your lungs are in. If you continue to smoke, you will soon die.]
O
O
mon
my
Dieu!
God
Avec
with
tout
all
ce
this
stress,
stress
je
I
veux/??j’espère
want/??hope
vraiment
truly
fumer
smoke.INF
une
a
cigarette
cigarette
dès
from
que
that
je
I
sortirai.
leave
‘Oh gosh, Doctor, with all this stress I really want/??hope to have a cigarette as
soon as I leave!’
(Portner and Rubinstein 2012: ex. (24))
Likewise the subject in (40) may think that it is impossible to build a perpetual motion
machine, and thus not be prepared to “argue in favor of all of the propositions which
would need to be in the [modal base] in order for [(40)] to be true” (2012: 479). But she
may still be prepared to argue that such propositions accurately describe the “reality
according to her glandular desire,” or how the world would need to be for a perpetual
motion machine to be possible.
(40) I want/??hope to build a perpetual motion machine.
(Portner and Rubinstein 2012: ex. (28))
Presupposing sense-(ii) commitment in (39)–(40) is nothing more than a general Qual-
ity commitment that what one is saying is true.
P&R aren’t alone in having issues with fiction verbs. Indicative-selection with fic-
tion verbs is puzzling from the perspective of traditional accounts of mood in terms
of realis/irrealis since the contents of dreams, imaginings, etc. don’t generally corre-
spond to reality. A common move in response is to treat fiction verbs as analogous
to other indicative-selecting verbs in representing a “reality,” albeit a fictional one.
Giannakidou expresses the idea well:
When I dream or imagine something, as a dreamer, I am fully committed to the
fictional reality of my dream … [F]ictional reality replaces the actual one…:
dream shifts the model of evaluation … to the [model of the dreamer, i.e. the
set of worlds compatible with the subject’s dream]. All worlds in that space are
p worlds, since reality no longer plays a role…. This suggests that the gram-
mar treats fictional contexts as shifted, non-partitioned states where veridicality
holds as if in the real world. Hence, dream and fiction verbs are subjectively …
veridical. (Giannakidou 2016: 21–22)
This is unexplanatory. Any modal backgrounds characterize a set of “best worlds” at
which a proposition may be true or false.13 One’s desires characterize a set of worlds
that best satisfy one’s desires, a “desire model” representing “the ideal reality of one’s
desires.” Why, then, do natural languages systematically treat “fictional realities,”
but not the “ideal realities” of subjects’ desires, as relevantly like actuality? Or treat
dreaming, but not wanting, as generally involving a kind of commitment relevantly like
the commitment in (say) knowing? An account of the operative notions of “reality”
13 In Kratzerian terms (given the limit assumption): a set of g(w)-minimal worlds in
⋂ f (w).
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or “commitment” must be provided to explain the relevant similarity between fiction
verbs and other indicative-selecting verbs. Intuitive appeals to fictional realities or
commitment “in the context of a dream” are insufficient.
3.4 Recap
Let’s recap. P&R argue that what distinguishes indicative-selecting verbs in French
is that they presuppose contextual commitmentPR to the verb’s modal backgrounds:
indicative-selecting verbs presuppose that every individual argument of the verb is pre-
pared to defend the reasonableness of the specific propositions in the modal base and
ordering source; subjunctive-selecting verbs lack this presupposition. I argued that
P&R’s understanding of “contextual commitment to a modal background” doesn’t
capture subjunctive-selection with emotive factives, indicative-selection with croire
or verbs of fiction, or the contrasting mood-selection properties of espérer versus
vouloir or promettre versus ordonner. Pace P&R, it isn’t in “the nature of” believing,
hoping, promising, etc. that the subjects/objects are disposed to defend the informa-
tion or priorities in question “in any relevant conversation” (2012: 477). I suggested
that P&R might revise their view and treat the relevant indicative-selecting predi-
cates as grammatically associated with indicative, parallel to how P&R treat certain
subjunctive-selecting predicates as grammatically associated with subjunctive. Yet
such moves threaten the explanatory and predictive power of P&R’s semantic analy-
sis of mood in terms of contextual commitmentPR, even for the central puzzle cases
which the account was designed to explain. The distinction between predicates that
do/don’t presuppose contextual commitmentPR cuts across the distinction between
indicative-selecting/subjunctive-selecting predicates.14
The following section develops an alternative approach to integrating a notion
of commitment in an account of verbal mood. The proposed analysis of mood pro-
vides a more explanatory treatment of the core puzzle cases from Sects. 1–3. The
account derives the relevant mood-selection data without relying on grammaticalized
mood or treating contentious substantive assumptions about the nature of promising,
etc. as conventionalized in the semantics. Appeals to informal notions such as “vis-
ceral”/“glandular” attitudes versus “intellectual” attitudes, or commitments “in the
context of a dream,” won’t be required.
4 Mood selection and states of mind
A key innovation in P&R’s account is to treat mood selection as fundamentally depend-
ing on a relation between individuals’ attitudes and the embedding predicate’s modal
14 In closing their discussion P&R suggest that contextual commitment may help explain linguistic phe-
nomena beyond mood selection (2012: 484). For instance, Rubinstein (2012) argues that what distinguishes
weak necessity modals (‘ought’, ‘should’) and strong necessity modals (‘must’, ‘have to’) is that strong
necessity modals presuppose collective commitmentPR to the relevant modal backgrounds, and weak neces-
sity modals presuppose a lack of collective commitmentPR. See Silk (2018) for extended critical discussion,
and an alternative account of the weak vs. strong necessity modal distinction and interactions with con-
textual assumptions. It isn’t commitment to the content of modal backgrounds that explains differences in
mood selection or modal strength.
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backgrounds, rather than (e.g.) on attitudes about the truth value of the complement.
P&R’s general strategy is to explain mood selection in terms of whether relevant indi-
viduals are “committed,” in a qualitatively defined sense, to the predicate’s modal
backgrounds. An alternative approach—the one I wish to explore here—is to explain
mood selection in terms of whether the relation between the predicate’s modal back-
grounds and a relevant overall state of mind represents a relation of commitment. I
call this general approach a state-of-mind approach to verbal mood.
To preview: I propose that indicative mood in French presupposes that the pred-
icate’s modal backgrounds are “live” (in a manner to be made precise) from the
perspective of the state of mind characterizing the event described by the predi-
cate. Indicative-selecting predicates “presuppose commitment,” not in the sense of
presupposing a commitment to the truth of the complement or of presupposing
a disposition to defend the reasonableness of the propositions in the predicate’s
modal base/ordering source, but in the sense of presupposing that the informational-
evaluative state determined by the predicate’s modal backgrounds is a substate of the
informational-evaluative state characterizing the local attitude/discourse event. These
ideas can be given a perspicuous formalization. The account captures the core mood-
selection puzzles from Sect. 1, and provides an improved treatment of the examples
from Sect. 3 which posed challenges for P&R. Patterns of mood selection are derived
from the proposed semantics of mood, independently attested features of the verbs’
semantics, and general principles of interpretation.
4.1 Background and analysis
The state-of-mind approach analyzes verbal mood in terms of a relation between a
predicate’s modal backgrounds and a representation of an overall state of mind—in
French, a representation of the state of mind characterizing the event described by
the predicate. How one implements the approach will depend on one’s broader views
about the morphosyntax and semantics of the embedding predicates and of the root
and embedded clauses, and one’s substantive views about the representation of context
and attitude states. Let’s start with the latter.
It’s common to include in a model of context a parameter representing information
taken for granted for the purposes of conversation. This background information, or
common ground (CG), delimits the set of live possibilities in the discourse, i.e. the
worlds among which the participants intend to distinguish, or context set (CS = ⋂ CG)
(Stalnaker 1978, 2014; Clark 1996). In making assertions we winnow down the con-
text set and settle on a more complete picture of the world. Yet conversation doesn’t
just involve sharing information. Inquiry is, in part, inquiry about what to do. It is thus
also common to include a parameter representing norms or priorities accepted for pur-
poses of conversation (Lewis 1979; Lochbaum 1998; Portner 2004, 2007; Starr 2010;
Charlow 2011; Rubinstein 2012; Zanuttini et al. 2012). These contextual parameters
determine a preordered set (CS,CP)—the set of live possibilities CS preordered in
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light of the accepted body of priorities CP. This represents the discourse context, the
body of information and priorities presumed available for communication.15
Just as concrete discourse contexts can be represented by a body of information
and priorities, so too subjects’ concrete (content-bearing) attitudes and overall states
of mind. For a discourse, the information is CG and the priorities are CP, yielding
a preordered set of live possibilities
(
CS,CP
)
. For an attitude, the representation
targets information and priorities characterizing the attitude event—for instance, the
subject’s propositional beliefs DOX and desires DES, yielding a preordered set of
doxastic alternatives
(⋂
DOX,DES
)
.
A central insight in Hacquard’s (2006, 2010; Anand and Hacquard 2014) work
on modal and attitude semantics is the linguistic importance of a distinction between
content-bearing and non-content-bearing events, and a notion of the content charac-
terizing an event. A distinctive feature of attitude and speech events is that they are
conceptualized as having informational content. The present appeal to states of mind
generalizes these ideas and extends them to the domain of verbal mood. The state of
mind characterizing an (attitude, speech) event may include both doxastic and broadly
evaluative aspects.
Call a pair of a body of information and body of priorities a modal state. Our hypoth-
esis about mood selection in French can be characterized in terms of a relation between
the modal state determined by the predicate’s modal backgrounds and the modal state
representing the state of mind characterizing the event described by the predicate.
To fix ideas I follow P&R in treating mood morphemes in complement clauses as
licensed by mood features adjoined to the embedding predicate, as in (41)–(42). Lex-
ical entries for the indicative-licensing feature and subjunctive-licensing feature are
given in (44)–(45). Simplified truth conditions for (41) follow in (46). (Like P&R, I
follow Hacquard (2006, 2010) in treating modal backgrounds as relativized to events,
and I assume that the predicate’s individual arguments are introduced by thematic
roles. SoM is a partial function from events e to preordered sets of worlds representing
the informational-evaluative content of the state of mind characterizing e. More on
these points below.)16
(41) Alice
Alice
[[[ [+_ind] croit] f ] g]
thinks
que
that
Blanche
Blanche
être-ind
be-indic
végétarienne.
vegetarian
(42) Alice
Alice
[[[ [+_sbjv] veut] f ] g]
thinks
que
that
Blanche
Blanche
être-sbjv
be-sbjv
végétarienne.
vegetarian
15 I ignore potential further parameters such as for the Question Under Discussion (Roberts 1996; Ginzburg
2012), or explicit representations of interlocutors’ individual public commitments (Gunlogson 2001, 2008;
Farkas and Bruce 2010; Lauer 2013; Malamud and Stephenson 2015).
16 The presuppositions in (44)/(46) use the ordering semantics formalization in (43a). The alternative
formalizations aren’t strictly speaking equivalent, since the relation between the preorders ,′ in (43a) is
restricted to worlds in the respective preordered sets. This is to reflect the conceptual idea that mood selection
is sensitive to a relation between informational-evaluative states. Insofar as one treats the preordered sets
of worlds as basic in the representation of such states, it is natural to restrict attention in this way.
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(43) Live modal states (ordering semantics, premise semantics)
Let F, F ′, G, G ′ be sets of propositions; let S, S′ be sets of worlds; and let
,′ be preorders on worlds.
a.
(
S,
)

(
S′,′
)
—read: the modal state
(
S,
)
is live from the per-
spective of
(
S′,′
)
—iff
(
S,
)
is a subpreorder of
(
S′,′
)
, i.e. iff
S ⊆ S′ ∧ ( ∩ S2) ⊆ (′ ∩ S′2), where X2 = {〈i, j〉 : i ∈ X ∧ j ∈ X}.
b. (F, G)  (F ′, G ′) iff F ⊇ F ′ ∧ G ⊇ G ′.
(44) [+_ind]w = λPλ f λgλpλe : (⋂ f (e),g(e)
)
 SoM(e) . P( f )(g)(p)(e)
(45) [+_sbjv]w = λPλ f λgλpλe . P( f )(g)(p)(e)
(46) (41)w is defined only if (⋂ fbel(e),gbel(e)
)
 SoM(e).
When defined, (41)w = 1 iff ∃e[e in w ∧ bel(e) ∧ exp(e, A) ∧ for every
gbel(e)-minimal world w′ in
⋂ fbel(e), Blanche is vegetarian in w′]
The subjunctive feature, [+_sbjv], is semantically vacuous. [+_sbjv] appears when
more contentful mood features, such as [+_ind], are unavailable; in this sense it
serves as a semantic default (Portner 1997; Schlenker 2005; Marques 2009; Siegel
2009; Portner and Rubinstein 2012). The indicative feature, [+_ind], is the seman-
tically marked case. Roughly put, indicative mood in a clause is associated with a
presupposition that the modal evaluation of the clause only considers worlds and eval-
uative relations that aren’t excluded by the information and priorities characterizing
the local attitude/discourse event. [+_ind] requires that the modal state determined by
the predicate’s semantics
(⋂ fP (e),gP (e)
)
—the modal state figuring in the composi-
tional semantic evaluation of the complement— be live in the sense of being included
in, or a substate of, the modal state SoM(e) representing the informational-evaluative
content (“state of mind”) of the event described by the predicate. The proposal admits
of an elegant formalization: the preordered set
(⋂ fP (e),gP (e)
)
must be a subpre-
order of SoM(e).
Our representations of concrete discourses and attitude states could be complicated
in various ways. For instance, Portner (2007, 2004) associates each interlocutor with
her own To-do List, and treats the elements of To-do Lists as properties. The evaluative
component in representations of discourses and attitudes could also be partitioned into
subtypes or treated as a sequence in order to explicitly represent different types of
priorities (cf. Portner 2007). The presupposition in (44) could be revised accordingly
to require that the preorder determined by the predicate’s modal background gP be a
subset of the relevant coordinate/subtype of the priority-based sequence/partition in
SoM(e). Given our purposes I bracket such potential complications. In general, what
will be important for mood selection is whether the modal parameter in question bears
the appropriate logical relation to the analogous component in the representation of
context/attitudes. In the explanations to follow I assume that the preorders/premise
sets represent priorities of the relevant type, and I treat contextual bodies of priorities,
like ordering sources, as sets of propositions.
The remainder of the section applies the above analysis to the mood-selection
puzzles from Sect. 1. First, a general remark on the theoretical status of “states of
mind” and their role in explaining mood data will be helpful. I use the metalanguage
predicate ‘SoM’ as a convenient shorthand for a relation between events and repre-
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sentations of informational-evaluative states; SoM isn’t something lexically specific
like modal backgrounds (cf. Hacquard’s (2006, 2010) metalanguage ‘con’ predicate).
So it is misplaced to ask about the state of mind “associated with” specific predi-
cates, like one might ask about the modal backgrounds of ‘want’ versus ‘hope’, etc.
My only assumption is that concrete discourse events and concrete attitude events—
the sorts of events described by speech-act predicates and attitude predicates—have
informational-evaluative content as indicated above: for a discourse event e, SoM(e)
may represent the mutually presupposed information and priorities in e,
(
CSe,CPe
)
;
for an attitude event e, SoM(e) may represent the subject’s doxastic+affective state in
e, e.g.
(⋂
DOXe,DESe
)
.
17 The goal in what follows is to derive the mood-selection
data from (i) this general assumption about the informational-evaluative content of
discourse events and attitude events, (ii) independent linguistic evidence about the
predicates’ specific modal backgrounds, and (iii) general interpretive principles.
4.2 Applications
This section applies the proposal from Sect. 4.1 to the central puzzle cases discussed in
Sects. 1–3. I start in Sects. 4.2.1–4.2.4 with attitude predicates (narrowly construed);
Sects. 4.2.5–4.2.6 turn to speech-act predicates.
4.2.1 Indicative-selection with croire
Croire ‘believe’ takes a doxastic modal base fbel(e) representing the beliefs of the agent
of e. Croire might take an additional doxastic modal background as ordering source,
e.g. reflecting the subject’s attitudes about normality or probabilities. For simplicity
we can bracket this potential complication, and treat doxastic ordering sources gbel
and preorders dox as trivial in representations of context and attitudes. As an attitude
verb, croire describes an aspect of an attitude event e. The informational-evaluative
content of the event—the “state of mind” characterizing it, SoM(e)—is the subject’s
overall doxastic-evaluative state of mind. Hence the presupposition of [+_ind] is
invariably satisfied, since the predicate’s modal base and ordering source are equivalent
to the analogous components in the representation of the subject’s state of mind (see
Sect. 4.1): fbel(e) = DOXe, and gbel(e) = doxe = ∅. Given a principle such as
Maximize Presupposition! (Heim 1991),18 indicative mood is selected.
This account of croire avoids the difficulties with P&R’s account discussed in
Sect. 3.1. Recall, for instance, (20) and (23), reproduced below.
(47) [Context: Same as (20)]
a. Bert doesn’t fully realize it yet, but he thinks that women are less capable
than men in the workplace, and that their proper place is in the home.
17 I use ‘DOXe’ as short for ‘DOX(ιx exp(e, x), w)’, the set of propositions representing the beliefs of the
subject/experiencer of e; likewise for ‘DESe’ and the subject’s desires.
18 To a first approximation: when sentences S and S′ are contextual alternatives with the same asserted
content and S′ has stronger presuppositions, use S′.
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b. Bert thinks that women are less capable than men in the workplace, but he
would deny it if you asked him.
The indicative presupposition in (44) doesn’t require that the subject be disposed to
argue for the propositions in fbel(e). It requires that the modal state figuring in the
predicate’s semantics be included in the modal state representing the subject’s state of
mind—here, that
⋂ fbel(e) ⊆ ⋂ DOXe. Whether the subject is introspectively aware
of her state of mind, and how exactly her state of mind is manifested in her (verbal)
dispositions, are other matters.
4.2.2 Indicative-selection with fiction verbs
The above account of indicative-selection with croire can be extended to fiction verbs.
For instance, rêver ‘dream’ takes a modal base that represents the content of the
subject’s dream. (As with croire, let’s assume the ordering source is empty.) As
an attitude verb, rêver describes an attitude event, namely a dreaming event e. The
informational-evaluative content of e, SoM(e), is the content of the dream. Hence the
presupposition of [+_ind] is invariably satisfied: as with croire, it is trivially the case
that
(⋂ fdream(e),gdream(e)
)
 SoM(e); the modal states are equivalent. A state-of-
mind approach gives precise expression to intuitive appeals to “fictional realities” or
commitments “in the context of a dream” in previous accounts (Sect. 3.3).
4.2.3 Indicative-selection with espérer versus subjunctive-selection with vouloir
Espérer ‘hope’ and vouloir ‘want’ are both desire verbs, yet espérer selects indicative
and vouloir selects subjunctive. As attitude verbs they describe aspects of attitude
events e. The type of informational-evaluative content of the events is the same: SoM(e)
represents the subject’s overall state of mind. The contrast in mood selection between
espérer and vouloir can be derived from the relation between this common element
and independently attested differences in the verbs’ semantics.
Let’s start schematically. Suppose we have some desire predicate ‘D’; its ordering
source gD represents the subject’s desires, and we are inquiring about the relation
between its modal base fD and the subject’s beliefs. It is common in work on modal
expressions to posit a diversity condition on modal bases in order to avoid trivialities in
the derivation of truth conditions (Frank 1996; Condoravdi 2002; Werner 2003; termi-
nology varies). For present purposes we can treat such a condition as requiring that any
non-empty ordering source non-trivially distinguish among worlds in the modal base
with respect to the embedded proposition p—formally, that for any g(e) = ∅, there
is some p-world u and some ¬p-world v in ⋂ f (e) such that u g(e) v ∨ v g(e) u.
Given the diversity condition,
⋂ fD(e) must include some ¬p-worlds, for any use
of ‘D’ with complement ‘p’. There are various ways the satisfaction of this require-
ment might play out in the lexical semantics and behavior of the predicate. ‘D’ might
take a modal base that represents the subject’s beliefs, i.e. fD = DOX. Sentences
‘x D p’ would then imply that x’s beliefs are compatible with ¬p. Alternatively, ‘D’
might take a modal base that represents some subset of the subject’s beliefs, so that⋂ fD(e) ⊃ ⋂ DOXe. Sentences ‘x D p’ then needn’t imply that x takes ¬p to be
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possible, since the ¬p-worlds in ⋂ fD(e) satisfying the diversity condition may be
outside x’s doxastic alternatives, i.e. in
⋂ fD(e) − ⋂ DOXe.
I suggest that ‘hope’ and ‘want’, and their crosslinguistic correlates, lexicalize
precisely these options. The contrasting mood-selection properties of espérer and
vouloir fall out given (i) our (linguistic) analysis of mood morphemes and (ii) our
general (non-linguistic) assumption that the informational-evaluative content of an
attitude event represents the subject’s overall state of mind. Put another way, we can
reason as follows: Assume as a working hypothesis that espérer and vouloir both take
ordering sources representing the subject’s desires. The predicates’ mood-selection
properties can be derived from independent linguistic evidence about the predicates’
modal bases, given the diversity condition, and the relation between these modal bases
and subjects’ beliefs. (We will revisit the assumption that both predicates’ ordering
sources represent the subject’s desires below.)
Start with vouloir ‘want’. Consider (48) from Heim, French variant in (49).
(48) (John hired a babysitter because) he wants to go to the movies tonight.
(Heim, 1992, ex. (44))
(49) Jean
Jean
a
has
embauché
hired
une
a
baby-sitter
babysitter
parce qu’il
because he
veut
wants
que
that
nous
we
allions.SBJV
go.SBJV
au
to the
cinéma.
movies
As Heim notes, (48) is compatible with John’s being certain about whether he will go to
the movies tonight. If the modal base for ‘want’ was identified with the subject’s beliefs,
every world in
⋂ fwant(e) would be a world in which John goes to the movies. Since
‘want’ takes a non-trivial ordering source (representing, say, the subject’s desires),
the diversity condition on modal bases would be violated. The felicity of examples
such as (48)/(49) thus indicates that fwant cannot be identified with the subject’s
beliefs. This leads Heim to treat
⋂ fwant(e) as a superset of the subject’s doxastic
alternatives—specifically, as representing what the subject believes to be the case
no matter how she chooses to act (Heim 1992: 199).19 So, ⋂ fwant(e) 
⋂
DOXe.
So, the presupposition in (44) is violated—(⋂ fwant(e),gwant(e)
)
 SoM(e)—and
the subjunctive-licensing feature [+_sbjv] must be used with vouloir. Subjunctive-
selection with vouloir can be derived from independently motivated treatments of the
predicate’s modal backgrounds.
19 Heim’s specific treatment of fwant may need to be refined to cover cases where one’s certainty that p
is due to beliefs about other events regarded as depending on one’s desires, as in (i).
(i) [Context: You have a genie who has perfect knowledge of your mental states and will ensure that your
desires today get satisfied no matter whether you choose to do anything to satisfy them. You know
you’re about to become unconscious until tonight. Before doing so, you say:]
I’m calling a babysitter because I want to go to the movies tonight.
To a first approximation, fwant(e) might be identified instead with what the subject believes to be the case
no matter what she desires. We can put such issues about the specific lexical semantics aside. What is
important for matters of mood selection is simply that
⋂ fwant(e) 
⋂
DOXe .
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This derivation of subjunctive-selection with vouloir captures subjunctive-selection
with related expressions of intention, such as l’intention est que in (50).
(50) L’intention
The intention
est
is
qu’il
that he
aille
go.SBJV
au
to the
cinéma.
movies.
Like (48), (51) is felicitous even if John is certain that he will go to the movies tonight
(assuming he isn’t certain that he will go no matter what he chooses to do).
(51) John intends to go to the movies tonight. (Heim 1992: 199)
The modal base for expressions of intention
⋂ fint(e) is like the modal base for ‘want’
in being a superset of the doxastic alternatives
⋂
DOXe (Heim 1992: 199). This
correctly predicts subjunctive-selection with expressions such as l’intention est que.
Subjunctive-selection with expressions of intention poses a challenge for P&R’s
contextual commitment account. It is hard to see why a subject wouldn’t be prepared
to defend what she intends to do.
The above examples highlight an important contrast between ‘want’/‘intend’ and
‘hope’. Whereas (48)–(49) are felicitous even if John is certain about whether he will
go to the movies, (52)–(53) with ‘hope’ are not.
(52) ??(John hired a babysitter because) he hopes to go to the movies tonight.
(53) ??Jean
Jean
a embauché
hired
une
a
baby-sitter
babysitter
parce qu’il
because he
espère
hopes
que
that
nous
we
allons.IND
go.IND
au
to the
cinéma.
movies
This contrast makes sense on the hypothesis that the modal base for ‘hope’ is the
subject’s beliefs. Since ‘hope’ takes a (bouletic) ordering source, the diversity condi-
tion requires that there be some ¬p-worlds in the modal base. Treating fhope as DOX
correctly predicts that (52)–(53) imply that John is leaving open the possibility that
he might do something other than go to the movies later—hence the infelicity in the
given context. Indeed we already saw evidence for treating the modal base for ‘hope’
in this way in Sect. 3.3: (54) is anomalous if the subject thinks that building a perpetual
motion machine is impossible.
(54) ??I hope to build a perpetual motion machine.
Treating fhope as DOX reflects the common idea that ‘hope’-ascriptions require that
the subject believes the complement is possible.
So, examples such as (52)–(54) provide independent support for treating the modal
base fhope(e) as representing the subject’s beliefs. Given that the ordering source
ghope(e) represents the subject’s desires (=DESe), the presupposition of [+_ind] is
invariably satisfied: The modal state
(⋂ fhope(e),ghope(e)
)
determined by the pred-
icate’s modal backgrounds is live from the perspective of the representation of the
subject’s state of mind (⋂ DOXe,DESe
) (Sect. 4.1). So espérer selects indicative.
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These accounts of indicative-selection with espérer and subjunctive-selection with
vouloir capture the conversational contrasts observed in Sects. 2–3. First, recall (15)
and (39) from P&R, reproduced in (55)–(56), respectively. (For space purposes I only
include the English translations. Below, let killed be the proposition that the bishop is
killed, and cig be the proposition that the subject has a cigarette.)
(55) [Context: Same as (15)]
a. ?? But you hoped for him to be killed!
b. But you wanted him to be killed!
(56) [Context: Same as (39)]
a. ?? Oh gosh, Doctor, with all this stress I really hope to have a cigarette!
b. Oh gosh, Doctor, with all this stress I really want to have a cigarette!
(from Portner and Rubinstein 2012: exs. (24)–(25))
In typical contexts for (55) it would be assumed that, given the king’s authority, if the
king wants something done, it gets done (or at least it would be assumed that the king
takes himself to have such authority). So, since the king desires to have the bishop
killed, it would be assumed—at least for purposes of conversation—that the king
believes that the bishop will get killed. So,
⋂ fhope(e) ⊆ killed, violating the diversity
condition—hence the anomalousness of (55a) with espérer ‘hope’. Similarly, in (56)
the subject is plausibly assuming—at least for purposes of conversation—that she
won’t in fact have a cigarette when she leaves. So,
⋂ fhope(e) ⊆ ¬cig—hence the
anomalousness of (56a). By contrast, the modal bases ⋂ fwant(e) in the (b)-examples
with vouloir ‘want’ can include worlds outside the subject’s doxastic alternatives. The
modal base in (55b) includes worlds that differ with respect to the bishop’s being
killed, and the modal base in (56b) includes worlds that differ with respect to the
patient’s having a cigarette. The diversity condition is satisfied. Given the subjects’
desires, the ‘want’-ascriptions can thus be felicitous and true.
This diagnosis assimilates the contrasts between (55a)/(56a) and (55b)/(56b) with
the contrast between (48)/(49) and (52)/(53); the contrasts are treated as due to differ-
ences in modal base. Yet we saw in Sects. 2–3 that P&R treat the infelicity of ‘hope’
in (55)–(56) in terms of the subject’s unwillingness to defend the relevant desire. The
felicity of ‘hope’ in the alternative contexts in (57)–(58) speaks against explaining
the contrasts in (55)–(56) in terms of differences in ordering source: the contexts in
(55)/(56) and (57)/(58) are equivalent vis-à-vis the relevant ordering source and the
subject’s commitments to the relevant desires.
(57) [Context: The king writes in his private journal about how annoyed he is with
the bishop. Unbeknownst to the king, the knights stumble across the journal,
read the entry about the bishop, and go ahead and kill him. When the king
hears about it, he is angry. The knights say:]
But you hoped he would die!
(58) [Context: In your last appointment the doctor told you that if you continued
to smoke, you would soon die. At the time you were out of cigarettes, and you
weren’t sure whether you would be able to get more after leaving the office.
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In your next visit, you recount your experience and say:]
With all the stress I really hoped to have a cigarette as soon as I left!
Our above modal-base explanation correctly predicts that the ‘hope’-ascriptions should
improve in contexts where the subject isn’t assumed to have a specific belief about the
complement, as in (57)–(58).
That said, the account of mood in Sect. 4.1 is compatible with explaining instances
of mood selection in terms of properties of the ordering source: the presupposition
of [+_ind] is violated if the predicate’s preorder gP (e) includes evaluative relations
that aren’t represented in the subject’s priorities of the relevant type (Sect. 4.1). P&R’s
example in (19), reproduced in (59), may provide precisely such a case.
(59) a. ??
??
J’espère
I hope
épouser
to marry
Alice,
Alice
et
and
j’espère
I hope
épouser
to marry
Sue.
Sue
b. Je
I
veux
want
épouser
to marry
Alice,
Alice
et
and
je
I
veux
want
épouser
to marry
Sue.
Sue
Suppose we give espérer ‘hope’ the semantics of an ordinary necessity modal—i.e.,
requiring that the embedded proposition is true at every ghope(e)-minimal world in
the modal base
⋂ fhope(e)—parallel to the semantics for croire in (46).
(60) x espérer pw is defined only if (⋂ fhope(e),ghope(e)
)
 SoM(e).
When defined, x espérer pw = 1 iff ∃e[e in w ∧ hope(e) ∧ exp(e, xw) ∧
for every ghope(e)-minimal world w′ in
⋂ fhope(e), pw′ = 1]
On such a semantics, a conjunction of the form ‘x hopes p and x hopes q’, for (contex-
tual) contraries p and q, cannot be (non-vacuously) satisfied relative to constant modal
backgrounds fhope and ghope for both conjuncts. Even allowing for intra-sentential
shifts in modal backgrounds, the indicative presupposition precludes the possibility of
satisfying such conjunctions by interpreting each conjunct relative to different subsets
of the subject’s desires. This presupposition requires the ordering source ghope(e) to be
a (possibly improper) superset of DESe. Hence the ordering source for each conjunct
of (59a) must represent the contents of both of the conflicting desires; it must include
both the proposition that x marries Alice (alice) and the proposition that x marries
Sue (sue). So, given that x cannot marry both Alice and Sue, the alice-worlds in the
modal base are ghope(e)-incomparable to the sue-worlds, and (59a) cannot be true.
In contrast, (59b) with vouloir lacks the proposed indicative constraint on the
ordering source. This allows for the possibility of having an ordering source that
represents a relevant subset of the subject’s desires. (59b) can be true even if vouloir is
given an ordinary semantics of necessity like espérer, universally quantifying over
a set of minimal accessible worlds: the first conjunct can be true relative to the
Alice-relevant subset of the subject’s desires, say g1want(e) = {alice}, and the second
conjunct can be true relative to the Sue-relevant subset of the subject’s desires, say
g2want(e) = {sue}. In effect, the shift in relevant subsets of DESe allows one to bracket
inconsistencies/incomparabilities in the subject’s overall desires. Although the alice-
worlds in x’s doxastic alternatives are DESe -incomparable to the sue-worlds—i.e.
〈a, s〉 /∈ DESe ∧ 〈s, a〉 /∈ DESe for any alice-world a and sue-world s in
⋂
DOXe—
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the predicate’s preorder gwant(e) can relate worlds in ways that are excluded by DESe.
So, (59b) is true insofar as (i) every g1want(e)-minimal relevant world is an alice-world,
and is g1want(e)-better than any sue-world; and (ii) every g2want(e)-minimal relevant
world is a sue-world, and is g2want(e)-better than any alice-world. “Bouletic dilemmas”
are coherently expressible with vouloir ‘want’ and not with espérer ‘hope’.20
4.2.4 Subjunctive-selection with emotive factives
Emotive factives are prima facie puzzling from the perspective of a commitment-
based approach to mood selection: If emotive factives imply commitment to their
complements, why do they generally select subjunctive in French? Whence the contrast
between (61) with the emotive factive être heureux ‘be happy’, and (62) with the non-
emotive factive savoir or desiderative espérer?
(61) Alice
Alice
est
is
heureuse
happy
que
that
Blanche
Blanche
soit
is.SBJV
végétarienne.
vegetarian
(62) Alice
Alice
sait/espère
knows/hopes
que
that
Blanche
Blanche
est
is.IND
végétarienne.
vegetarian
Our account of mood from Sect. 4.1 provides a solution: Subjunctive-selection with
emotive factives follows from the combination of their factivity implication and the
diversity condition on modal bases. The factivity of être heureux requires (at least) that
the subject believes the embedded proposition p, i.e. that ⋂ DOXe ⊆ p; (61) implies
that Alice believes that Blanche is vegetarian. So, if the modal base was identified
with the subject’s beliefs, p would be true throughout the modal base. This would
violate the diversity condition, given that the predicate takes a non-trivial (bouletic)
ordering source. One isn’t happy about everything one believes to be the case. So, the
modal base
⋂ fhappy(e) must include some ¬p-worlds. So, ⋂ fhappy(e)  ⋂ DOXe,
and the presupposition of [+_ind] is violated: (⋂ fhappy(e),ghappy(e)
)
isn’t included
20 For the sake of argument I have assumed that ‘want’ has the same sort of necessity semantics as ‘hope’.
There may be independent reasons for weakening the semantics of ‘want’ in ways that would also allow for
the consistency of (59b) (see Lassiter 2011). For instance, consider the truth conditions in (i), adapted from
Swanson’s (2011) semantics for the weak necessity modal ‘ought’ (modified to make the limit assumption).
(A  chain is a totally preordered subset of a partial preorder  of a set of worlds; a maximal  chain is a
 chain that isn’t a proper subset of any  chain.)
(i) x vouloir pw = 1 iff ∃e[e in w ∧ want(e) ∧ exp(e, xw) ∧ there is some maximal gwant (e) chain
S such that pw′ = 1 for every gwant (e)-minimal world w′ in S ∩
⋂ fwant(e)]
The semantics in (i) treats ‘want’ as quantifying over the “bouletically best” worlds in the modal base given
some way of resolving incomparabilities in the subject’s desires; the necessity semantics in (60) for ‘hope’, in
contrast, quantifies over the minimal worlds in the modal base given every way of resolving incomparabilities
in the subject’s desires. These semantics predict the consistency of irresolvable dilemmas expressed with
‘want’ but not with ‘hope’—parallel to the cases of ‘ought’ and ‘must’ discussed by Swanson. What the
Swanson-style approach captures via incomparability-sensitive weakening of the truth conditions relative
to a constant ordering source, the approach in the main text captures via restrictions (or lack thereof) on
ordering sources and intra-sentential shifts. Connections with dilemmas and weak/strong necessity modals
may provide fruitful avenues to explore (see also Silk 2012, 2018; Rubinstein 2014).
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in SoM(e), the representation of the subject’s state of mind.21 Subjunctive-selection
with emotive factives follows from the proposed analysis of mood and independently
attested features of their semantics.
4.2.5 Indicative-selection with dire
Let’s turn to applying the state-of-mind account of mood to speech-act verbs. The
difference in the general pattern of explanation will be in the type of event described:
Attitude verbs describe aspects of subjects’ concrete states of mind; speech-act verbs
describe aspects of concrete discourses. For an attitude event e, the informational-
evaluative content of e, SoM(e), represents the subject’s overall state of mind; for
a discourse event e, the informational-evaluative content of e, SoM(e), represents
the state of the discourse, i.e. the mutually presupposed information and priorities
(Sect. 4.1). As previously, the task is to explain the mood-selection data in terms of
this general assumption about discourse events and independently attested features of
the verbs’ semantics.
Perhaps the most straightforward case is dire ‘say’. Dire takes a modal base
fsay(e) that represents the individual public presuppositions of the subject x in the
reported (possibly single-membered) discourse event e (written CGex ), i.e. what she
publicly treats as true for purposes of conversation. (As with croire, assume that
the ordering source gsay(e) and its analogue in the representation of context are
empty; Sects. 4.1, 4.2.1.) As a speech-act verb, dire describes an aspect of a reported
discourse e. The informational-evaluative content of e—the “state of mind” character-
izing it, SoM(e)—is the mutually presupposed information and priorities. Since one’s
individual public presuppositions in a discourse are a superset of the mutual public
presuppositions, CGex ⊇ CGe, the presupposition of [+_ind] is invariably satisfied:(⋂ fsay(e),gsay(e)
)
 SoM(e), since fsay(e) ⊇ CGe. Hence dire selects indicative.
4.2.6 Indicative-selection with promettre versus subjunctive-selection with ordonner
Finally, let’s consider commissives like promettre ‘promise’, which select indicative,
and directives like ordonner ‘order’, which select subjunctive. Commissives and direc-
tives are speech-act verbs: they describe aspects of discourse events e; they report—and
in special cases perform—commissive and directive speech acts. So, as above, the con-
tent of the events they describe, SoM(e), is the presuppositions and priorities of the
reported discourse. What should we say about the verbs’ modal backgrounds and their
relations to these contextual parameters?
Let’s start with ordonner. The ordering source gord(e) represents the subject’s com-
mitments about the obligations imposed on the object by the subject in the reported
discourse event e—roughly put, the object’s “subject-dependent priorities” in e. An
21 We can leave open how exactly the modal bases of emotive factives are identified. Following von Fintel
(1999), a plausible constraint is that ⋂ fE (e) properly include
⋂
DOXe . It’s worth flagging that although
emotive factives in French are often treated as requiring subjunctive (e.g., Schlenker 2005), some speakers
report finding optional uses of indicative to be possible (e.g., Farkas 2003). I leave open how the account
might be modified for the latter dialect or stage of French.
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initial idea might be to treat the modal base ford(e) as the common ground information
in the reported discourse event e. This would capture the anomalousness of directive
utterances enjoining p in contexts where p is presupposed:
(63) [Context: Addressee is sitting down.]
a. #Sit down!
b. #I order you to sit down.
On the hypothesis that ford(e) = CGe, such examples violate the diversity condition
since
⋂
CGe ⊆ p—hence the infelicity.
However, it won’t do simply to identify the predicate’s modal base with the reported
common ground. As noted in Sect. 3.2, directive utterances are anomalous when cou-
pled with denials that they will be satisfied; indeed directive utterances are compatible
with acceptance that they will be satisfied:
(64) a. Leave!—#even though (I know) you won’t.
b. I order you to leave!—#even though (I know) you won’t.
(cf. Portner 2009: 190)
(65) We didn’t call for backup because I ordered Alice and Bert to come to the
scene.
(66) [Context: After opening an email from your boss, you say to your project
team:]
The boss regrets that we’ll miss the party but he orders us to finish the project
tonight.
(67) I know you will clean the barracks because I order you to.
Though obligations can go unfulfilled, discourse participants appear to assume oth-
erwise for purposes of conversation when accepting directive utterances. Identifying
ford(e) with CGe incorrectly predicts (65)–(67) to violate the diversity condition and
hence be infelicitous like (63).
A natural response is to take up the Heim-style strategy for fwant from Sect. 4.2.3
and treat the modal base ford(e) as representing what is presupposed to be the case no
matter what the subject has ordered the object to do (cf. footnote 19). This captures
the felicity of examples such as (65)–(67). In (67), given that the addressee’s cleaning
the barracks depends at least partly on one’s order, both clean-worlds and ¬clean-
worlds are included in
⋂ ford(e), and the diversity condition isn’t violated. Ordering
p is compatible with a presupposition that p if one’s orders constitute the basis for
the presupposition that p. Examples such as (63) are still predicted infelicitous. If the
addressee already satisfies p or has committed to satisfying p for independent reasons,
it won’t be the case that p is true independent of one’s orders; so, the modal base will
imply p, violating diversity. The anomalousness of Bill’s order in (68) seems due, in
part, to the suggestion that our acceptance that Mary will bring the dessert is to be
grounded in his ordering her to do so rather than in Mary’s prior commitment.
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(68) Mary: I will bring dessert to the party later.
Bill: Yes. I order you to bring dessert.
Mary: I just that said I will! Sheesh.
Given that the presupposition that Mary will bring dessert is independent of Bill’s
order,
⋂ ford(e) ⊆ dessert and diversity is violated.
These observations about the modal base ford predict subjunctive-selection with
ordonner. What is presupposed to be the case no matter what has been ordered
is a superset of what is presupposed to be the case. So, parallel to the case of
vouloir,
⋂ ford(e) 
⋂
CGe and the presupposition of [+_ind] is violated—hence
subjunctive-selection with directives such as ordonner.
Now turn to commissives. The ordering source gprom(e) consists of the propositions
which the subject has committed to the object to being/making true—roughly put, the
subject’s “subject-dependent priorities” to the object in the reported discourse event
e. Above we observed a parallel between ordonner ‘order’ and vouloir ‘want’ in their
modal bases and resulting mood-selection properties. An attractive hypothesis is to
treat the mood-selection contrast between directives and commissives parallel to the
mood-selection contrast between vouloir and espérer. The modal base fhope(e) is
identified with the subject’s beliefs DOXe, a subset of which constitutes the modal
base fwant(e); so too, the thought goes, the modal base fprom(e) is identified with the
presuppositions of the reported discourse CGe, a subset of which constitutes the modal
base ford(e).
As with directives, making a promise is anomalous when coupled with an assertion
or assumption that it won’t be satisfied; (69)–(70), like (64), are infelicitous.
(69) I promise to bring dessert — #even though I won’t.
(70) [Context: It’s mutually presupposed that there is no way Mary will be able to
come to the party later. Mary says:]
#I promise to come to the party later.
Promising p generally presupposes that p is possible. Yet whereas ordering p is com-
patible with presupposing p as long as p’s truth is assumed to depend on one’s order,
as in (65)–(67), promising p seems to require that p not be presupposed. Although
promising p can be coupled with an assertion that p, as in (71)–(72), such examples
still seem to suggest that ¬p is a live possibility in the discourse. The function of the
promises in (71)–(72) is plausibly to reinforce a commitment to something that may
be open to doubt.
(71) I will bring dessert to the party later. I promise.
(72) Sue (to Bill):I will bring drinks to the party later. Mary will bring dessert.
Mary: Yes. I promise.
Promising p given a manifest presupposition that p is generally anomalous, even if
the presupposition that p depends on what one has promised. Using ‘promise’ in (75a)
is dispreferred as a reminder of something accepted in the common ground due to an
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earlier commitment. (74a) is odd, even if it would be generally felicitous for one to
presuppose p in light of a future-tense assertion that p, as in (74b).22
(73) [Context: You are waiting to hear from your friend Sue about whether she will
get off work in time to watch your children. After seeing a message from Sue,
you say to your partner:]
?Sue is glad we won’t need a babysitter since she promises to be here by 5.
(74) [Context: The party is starting soon, and your team can’t go until you finish
your part of the report. You say:]
a. ?I’m glad we won’t be late since I promise to finish the report in 10 minutes.
b. I’m glad we won’t be late since I’ll have the report finished in 10 minutes.
(75) [Context: Earlier you promised your partner you that would be home tonight
by 5 p.m. Your partner said ‘okay’, and your reliability isn’t doubted. Before
heading out for some errands, you say:]
a. ?I promise to be home by 5.
b. I’ll see you at 5.
Identifying fprom(e) with the reported common ground CGe captures this: the diversity
condition requires that there be some ¬p-worlds in ⋂ fprom(e) = ⋂ CGe, which
contrasts with the contextual assumption that p—hence the infelicity.
The above examples support treating the modal base fprom as representing the com-
mon ground information in the reported discourse. Our evidence with directives that
the set of modal-base worlds isn’t included in
⋂
CGe—the information characteriz-
ing the reported event e—doesn’t carry over to commissives. The presupposition of
[+_ind] is satisfied, and promettre selects indicative.
4.3 Selection and grammaticalization
The proposed state-of-mind account follows P&R and various others in the literature
in providing a semantic analysis of mood. Mood marking is treated in terms of a rela-
tion between the semantics of the predicates and mood features in context, rather than
simply in terms of the semantics of the predicates (as in e.g. Farkas 1992; Giannaki-
dou 1999). Distinguishing the contribution of mood features helps capture cases of
mood choice—predicates which can take indicative or subjunctive—without positing
distinct lexical entries. Yet it raises a potential worry about explanatoriness in cases of
selection. In Sect. 3 we saw that P&R treat vouloir and ordonner as lexically associ-
ated with [+_sbjv] in order to explain why the predicates must take subjunctive even
in contexts where the contextual commitmentPR presupposition is satisfied. In light
of parallel examples with indicative-selecting predicates—examples where indicative
22 The data contrasting orders and promisings are supported by preliminary results from an acceptability
judgment task via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Fifteen participants were asked how natural they found
the target sentences, on a scale from 1 (“completely unnatural”) to 7 (“completely natural”). Participants
reported (65)–(66) with ‘order’ as natural—for (65) the average rating was 5.67 (SEM = .27); for (66) the
average rating was 5.27 (SEM = .38). (73) with ‘promise’ was reported as relatively marginal, average
rating 3.93 (SEM = .56). Thanks to a referee.
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is required even though P&R’s posited presupposition of [+_ind] isn’t satisfied—I
noted that P&R might revise their account by positing grammaticalized indicative
as well. Grammaticalizing mood selection more generally in this way weakens the
explanatoriness of a semantic analysis of mood based on contextual commitmentPR.
The state-of-mind account developed in this section captures the mood-selection
properties of the predicates in question without positing lexical association with
mood-licensing features. The mood-selection properties of doxastic attitude verbs
such as croire, fiction verbs, desideratives such as vouloir and espérer, emotive fac-
tives, and various types of speech-act verbs are derived from the analysis of mood
in Sect. 4.1 along with independently attested features of the predicates’ semantics,
general assumptions about the informational-evaluative contents of attitude/discourse
events, and general principles of interpretation (Maximize Presupposition!, diversity
condition). This isn’t to say that there is no grammaticalization in matters of mood
selection. But, other things equal, we should prefer an account which derives the mood-
selection properties without stipulating them in the grammar or lexical semantics.
4.4 Modal adjectives
This paper has focused on puzzles of mood selection with speech-act and atti-
tude verbs. An important contribution of P&R’s discussion is to introduce data
with modal adjectives (possible, probable, nécessaire) into theorizing about mood.
Modal adjectives ostensibly afford a fruitful test case for P&R’s approach: since
what modal backgrounds are relevant for interpreting the adjectives depends on
context, pragmatic correlates of mood choice such as commitment of speaker,
addressee, etc. might seem more apparent.23 Yet, as noted in Sect. 1, it is pre-
cisely because of this contextual dependence that I have set the adjectives aside
(see footnote 3). Questions about the context-sensitivity and modal backgrounds of
epistemic and normative/evaluative readings of modals are fraught. Ongoing contex-
tualism/relativism/expressivism debates highlight independently contentious issues
regarding how the apparent context-sensitivity is to be implemented, what modal
backgrounds are “relevant” in particular cases, and in some cases what the data even
are. A principal point of contention is what the modal background represents as a func-
tion of context—for instance, for certain epistemic readings, whether it represents the
speaker’s information (evidence, knowledge, etc.), the pooled information of a rele-
vant group, or the discourse common ground. How graded modal expressions are to
be analyzed in classic ordering semantics/premise semantics, and whether they can be
analyzed in the classic framework at all, remains to be seen. Settling on such issues is
precisely what would be needed for developing and evaluating a state-of-mind account.
That said, it may be useful to outline how the state-of-mind account in this section
might be applied to certain modal adjectives. I focus on nécessaire ‘necessary’ and
possible ‘possible’, given the additional complications mentioned above regarding
the modal backgrounds of gradable epistemic adjectives such as probable ‘probable’.
More thorough investigation of other adjectives, interpretive differences in cases of
23 Thanks to a referee for reinforcing the dialectical role of P&R’s modal adjective cases.
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mood choice, and interactions with broader work on context-sensitivity and modal
expressions is needed. Final assessment of the modal adjective data and its role in
adjudicating among theories of mood must await future research.
Consider subjunctive-selection with nécessaire and possible:
(76) Il
it
est
is
possible
possible
que
that
cet
this
échantillon
sample
soit
is.SBJV
dissout
dissolved
dans
in
l’eau.
the water
(77) Il
it
est
is
possible/nécessaire
possible/necessary
que
that
vous
you
preniez
take.SBJV
le
the
train
train
A.
A
(cf. Portner and Rubinstein 2012: exs. (15), (34))
Nécessaire and possible take a circumstantial modal base representing a set of circum-
stances/facts, and in priority-based interpretations an ordering source representing the
relevant type of priority. (P&R follow Rubinstein 2012 in treating nécessaire as lexi-
cally specifying a priority interpretation, often teleological.) The purely circumstantial
reading of possible in (76) says that the sample’s dissolving is possible given the rel-
evant circumstances fc(e). The teleological readings in (77) say that your taking the
A-train is possible/necessary in light of some contextually relevant goals gc(e) (say,
the goals of the individuals in e), given the circumstances fc(e).
As noted in Sect. 4.1, a key feature of Hacquard’s (2006, 2009, 2010) developments
of the event-relativity of modals is that speech-act/attitude/epistemic predicates are
distinguished from other predicates in being conceptualized as describing events with
content; events as described by root/non-epistemic modals are conceptualized as in
general lacking informational content.24 If this is right, subjunctive-selection for modal
adjectives such as nécessaire and possible taking circumstantial modal bases follows
straightaway: SoM is a partial function from contentful events. The presupposition
of [+_ind], (⋂ fc(e),gc(e)
)
 SoM(e), isn’t satisfied since SoM(e) is undefined.
Hence subjunctive must be used.
P&R appeal to the modal adjective cases in their arguments against the “proto-
standard analysis” of mood. For instance, subjunctive-selection in purely circumstan-
tial readings such as (76) is unexpected if subjunctive-selection is analyzed in terms of
taking a non-empty ordering source or having a comparative semantics. Yet P&R them-
selves ultimately appeal to grammaticalized mood for possible (and probable) (2012:
477, 480–481). Though P&R don’t mention grammaticalization with nécessaire, it
seems they would need to appeal to grammaticalized subjunctive for nécessaire as well.
Nécessaire, like possible, selects subjunctive even if the interlocutors are contextually
committed to the circumstantial/priority-based modal backgrounds. Although there
are certainly contexts where interlocutors aren’t collectively committed to the relevant
information or priorities, it is perhaps surprising that such contexts would be concep-
tualized as prototypical in the use of the adjectives. At minimum one might expect
some languages to treat uses of agreement and endorsement as prototypical. Yet modal
expressions of necessity/possibility typically select subjunctive across languages. The
state-of-mind treatment of subjunctive-selection with nécessaire and possible outlined
above avoids invoking grammaticalized mood. Subjunctive-selection falls out of the
24 Though see Sect. 6 on this as a possible source of crosslinguistic variation.
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proposed account of mood and a Hacquard-style treatment of the event-relativity of
modal backgrounds.
It’s worth noting that a state-of-mind account needn’t be hostage to a Hacquard-
inspired treatment of SoM as undefined for events as described by circumstantial modal
adjectives. Suppose that for such events one treats SoM(e) as representing the set of
facts in e. Uses of nécessaire ‘necessary’ and possible ‘possible’ are compatible with
the truth or acceptance of the embedded proposition p; the truth of p can even be
specified as among the relevant facts, as in (78).
(78) C’est
it’s
bien
good
que
that
cet
this
échantillon
sample
soit
is
dissous
dissolved
parce qu’il
because it
est
is
nécessaire
necessary
qu’il
that it
soit
is.SBJV
dissous
dissolved
pour
for
que
that
nous
we
puissions
can
obtenir
get
la
the
subvention.
grant
‘It’s good that this sample dissolves because it’s necessary for it to dissolve in
order for us to get the grant.’
(cf. Portner and Rubinstein 2012: ex. (16))
(79) Il
it
est
is
possible
possible
que
that
nous
we
prenions
take.SBJV
le
the
train
train
A.
A
Nous
we
allons
will
donc
therefore
arriver
arrive
au
to the
concert
concert
à temps.
on time
‘It’s possible for us to take the A-train. So, we’ll get to the concert on time.’
To avoid incorrectly predicting that such examples violate the diversity condition,
the modal bases fc(e) for the priority-based readings can be treated as some sub-
set of the set of circumstances in e (say, the set of facts that hold no matter what
the priorities are in e; cf. Frank 1996). So, ⋂ fc(e) isn’t included in the informa-
tional content characterizing e, SoM(e), and the presupposition of [+_ind] is violated.
Subjunctive-selection with purely circumstantial uses such as (76) might then be
understood as cases of grammaticalized mood. Many modal adjectives are like possi-
ble—and unlike attitude/speech-act verbs (or nécessaire, if Rubinstein 2012 is right)—
in being able to receive both priority-based and non-priority-based interpretations,
depending on the context. Given this flexibility it is perhaps not unexpected that
in cases where grammaticalization occurs, such adjectives should “generalize to the
weakest case” and become lexically associated with the unmarked mood feature, i.e.
[+_sbjv].25
25 It’s common in premise semantics for graded modality to treat expressions such as probable as taking
an ordering source determining the graded interpretation. A treatment of uses of probable with subjunctive
could then proceed parallel to the alternative treatment of nécessaire/possible given above. Uses of probable
are compatible with the truth or acceptance of the embedded proposition, as in (a); so, given the diversity
condition, the modal base
⋂ fc(e) must be a superset of the contextual information SoM(e), violating the
presupposition of [+_ind]:
(a) ll est probable que des amendements soient même présentés plus tard aujourd’hui au comité. Quelqu’un
décidera s’ils sont recevables ou non, et nous voterons ensuite.
‘It is probable that amendments will be.SBJV introduced even later today in committee. Someone will
rule whether they are in order or not, and we will vote.’
(www.noscommunes.ca/DocumentViewer/fr/40-3/chambre/seance-34/debats)
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5 Literature comparisons
We began in Sect. 1 by introducing accounts of mood which give a notion of commit-
ment a fundamental explanatory role. Sections 2–4 focused on critically examining
P&R’s specific “contextual commitment” account of mood selection in French and
comparing it to the proposed state-of-mind account. Indicative-selecting predicates
“presuppose commitment,” according to P&R’s qualitative definition of commitment,
in the sense of presupposing (roughly) that every individual argument of the predi-
cate is disposed to defend the propositions in the predicate’s modal base and ordering
source as reasonable in any relevant conversation. The strategy of the state-of-mind
approach from Sect. 4, in contrast, is to explain mood selection in terms of whether
the formal relation between the predicate’s modal backgrounds and an overall state of
mind represents a relation of commitment: Indicative-selecting predicates in French
“presuppose commitment” in the sense of presupposing that the modal state deter-
mined by the predicate’s semantics is “live” from the perspective of the modal state
representing the (attitude/discourse) event e described by the predicate. Sections 4.2–
4.3 argued that this account provides a more explanatory treatment of the puzzle cases
from Sects. 1–3. Now that the state-of-mind approach is on the table, briefly compar-
ing it to several other broadly commitment-based accounts may help further situate it
in the literature. I leave more detailed comparisons and discussion of other types of
accounts for future research.
A prominent approach is to analyze mood in terms of epistemic commitment to
the complement. To a first approximation, indicative-selecting predicates are treated
as implying that the speaker/subject takes the complement to be true (Noonan 1985;
Palmer 1986; Farkas 1992; Giannakidou 1999; Marques 2009; Siegel 2009), or bears
some suitably strong epistemic attitude toward the complement (Smirnova 2011).
Persistent challenges for these accounts include subjunctive-selection with emotive
factives (though see Siegel 2009), indicative-selection with fiction verbs and commis-
sives, and indicative-selection with ‘hope’.
Footnote 25 continued
Although probable often takes subjunctive, P&R observe that there are contexts where it can take indicative.
P&R’s account is less than compelling; apparent differences in interpretation between uses with subjunctive
and indicative are treated by appealing to multiple lexical entries, grammaticalized mood, and an unanalyzed
distinction between “subjective opinion” and “objective data” (2012: 474–475, 480). Theoretical worries
aside, empirical difficulties include indicative-taking descriptive uses of probable which don’t present the
speaker as accepting the relevant information, as in (b). (Half of the participants in a translation task
conducted via Amazon Mechanical Turk used indicative.) The speakers in such examples are committed to
thinking that the assumed modal background correctly represents the information in the filing cabinet—they
have “sense-(ii)” commitment in the sense of Sect. 3.3; they lack commitmentPR (cf. footnote 12).
(b) [Context: We’re standing before a locked filing cabinet. None of us has had access to the information
in it, but we know it contains the police’s evidence about Fischer’s murder and narrows down the
set of suspects. We’re betting on the chances that one of us may have killed Fischer according to the
information in the filing cabinet. You, who we all know is innocent, say:]
Il
it
est
is
probable
probable
que
that
je
I
l’ai
it have.IND
fait.
did
‘It’s probable that I did it.’ (cf. Kratzer 2012: 98–99)
I leave theorizing about a state-of-mind treatment of mood choice with probable for future research.
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Take, for instance, Giannakidou’s appeal to veridicality (Sect. 3.3). Though a notion
of veridicality might initially seem to be associated with notions of realis or truth,
in Giannakidou’s account it ends up amounting essentially to entailment: indicative-
selecting predicates are treated as predicates which entail the truth of their complement
in “some epistemic model.”26 The challenge is to provide an independent account of
what demarcates the class of epistemic models. What conceptually unifies sets of
worlds representing what someone says, believes, or dreams, and what distinguishes
them from sets of worlds representing what someone desires or orders? Why is impli-
cation by sets of worlds in the former class sufficient for “veridicality,” but implication
by sets of worlds in the latter class is not? Why would fiction verbs, which typically
don’t describe reality and whose complements typically aren’t regarded as true by
the subject, be systematically conceptualized as “veridical,” while directive verbs,
which report utterances that are incompatible with denials of their complements, be
systematically conceptualized as “non-veridical”?
Understanding indicative-selection in terms of states of mind captures intuitions
motivating epistemic-commitment accounts. Bearing a certain epistemic attitude
toward the complement is neither necessary nor sufficient for indicative-selection
in French. What is important is rather that the modal state determined by the predi-
cate’s semantics be included in the modal state representing the event described by the
predicate. This view carves out a role for both doxastic and evaluative commitments in
mood selection. And it allows for—indeed predicts—indicative-selecting predicates
which lack doxastic commitment to the complement (e.g., espérer), and subjunctive-
selecting predicates which imply doxastic commitment (e.g., emotive factives).
Schlenker’s (2005) account of mood selection in French bears important similarities
to the state-of-mind account developed in Sect. 4. On Schlenker’s account, indicative
mood presupposes that the evaluation world is in the “context set” of a relevant thought
event or speech event. The state-of-mind approach follows Schlenker in giving a
generalized notion of context a fundamentally explanatory role. However, first, on
Schlenker’s account the grammar leaves open what event determines the context set
relevant for satisfying the indicative presupposition. It might be the event described
by the embedding predicate (in which case the relevant context set is the verb’s modal
base) or the event described by the utterance (in which case the relevant context set
is the discourse context set). This view fails to explain why mood selection in French
seems to be systematically determined by the attitudes of the subject rather than the
speaker—e.g., why vouloir, directives, etc. cannot select indicative even if the speaker
is publicly committed to the complement. Second, Schlenker treats mood selection as
sensitive to a context set, which is conceptualized as a body of background information
for an assertive act. The account in Sect. 4 treats mood selection as sensitive to relevant
information and priorities (norms, preferences, etc.). Mood selection is analyzed in
terms of representations of overall states of mind and the informational-evaluative
contents of events.
26 To capture subjunctive-selection with various modal predicates, Giannakidou posits that all readings
of modals (including epistemic possibility/necessity modals and circumstantial modals) take non-empty
ordering sources (see also Giannakidou 2016; Giannakidou and Mari 2016). Our provisional treatment in
Sect. 4.4 of subjunctive with certain modal adjectives doesn’t require such a commitment.
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P&R present their account as a foil to what they call the “proto-standard” analysis
of mood (Sect. 2). Accounts in this tradition demarcate subjunctive-selecting pred-
icates as those predicates which take a non-trivial ordering source. As P&R argue,
indicative-selecting desideratives such as ‘hope’ and commissives pose challenges
for these accounts. Though the state-of-mind account doesn’t explain mood selection
fundamentally in terms of having a comparative semantics, our appeal to a general
diversity condition on modal bases suggests that ordering sources may have an indi-
rect effect on mood selection. The diversity condition requires that any non-empty
ordering source non-trivially distinguish among worlds in the modal base with respect
to the embedded proposition p. For any predicate that takes a non-empty ordering
source there must be p-worlds and ¬p-worlds in the modal base ⋂ f (e). Our account
predicts (inter alia) that, for any predicate P in French that takes a non-empty ordering
source: if P selects indicative, then uses of P are incompatible with assuming that
the informational content of the event e described by P (e.g., the subject’s beliefs, the
reported discourse common ground) implies p. On the flip side, if uses of P necessarily
assume that the informational content of the event described by P implies the embed-
ded proposition P , then P selects subjunctive. This captures indicative-selection with
espérer ‘hope’ and subjunctive-selection with emotive factives, respectively.
6 Conclusion and outlook
This paper has developed an account of mood selection with attitude predicates in
French. The guiding idea is to analyze mood in terms of a relation between a predi-
cate’s semantics and an overall state of mind: Indicative mood in French presupposes
that the modal evaluation of the clause relies only on worlds and evaluative relations
that are live from the perspective of the modal state representing the “state of mind”
characterizing the event e described by the embedding predicate P—formally, that
the preordered set
(⋂ fP (e),gP (e)
)
determined by P’s semantics is included in the
preordered set representing the informational-evaluative content of e, such as a sub-
ject’s overall doxastic-affective state or the mutually presupposed information and
priorities of a discourse. The aim has been to derive patterns of mood selection from
(i) the proposed analysis of mood, (ii) a general assumption about the informational-
evaluative content of discourse events and attitude events, (iii) independent linguistic
evidence about the predicates’ semantics and specific modal backgrounds, and
(iv) general principles of interpretation. I argued that the account captures various core
cases of mood selection. These cases include indicative-selection with croire, dire, and
fiction verbs, subjunctive-selection with emotive factives (in contrast to non-emotive
factives), indicative-selection with espérer versus subjunctive-selection with vouloir,
and indicative-selection with promettre versus subjunctive-selection with ordonner.
The proposed account captures intuitions motivating certain previous approaches to
mood selection, while improving in empirical coverage and explanatory power.
Our discussion has been limited. I only considered a single language: French. And
I focused on mood marking in the complements of attitude and speech-act predicates,
in particular on cases of mood selection, or predicates which require a particular mood
in the complement clause. It is worth investigating how the proposed account may be
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applied more generally—e.g., to mood marking in main clauses and mood switching
under negation and in questions; to cases of mood choice and interpretive differences
among examples with predicates that optionally take indicative or subjunctive; and to
mood selection/choice in other Romance and non-Romance languages. The approach
in this paper may provide a framework for addressing such broader issues. Consider
issues of crosslinguistic variation. The explanatory components in (i)–(iv) above elu-
cidate lines of inquiry for investigating mood crosslinguistically:
(i) For different languages: In the presupposition of the indicative feature, which
event is SoM sensitive to,27 and what is the required logical relation to the predi-
cate’s modal backgrounds? Does the indicative presupposition concern the content
of the event described by the local embedding predicate, as in French? Or does
it concern the content of the evaluation/speech event? Or does the semantics of
[+_ind] itself leave the option open? Is the modal state determined by SoM speci-
fied as including the modal state determined by the predicate’s modal backgrounds?
(ii) How do speakers conceptualize the informational-evaluative content, if any,
of different types of events? Do speakers generally conceptualize the distinction
between content-bearing versus non-content-bearing events in terms of a dis-
tinction between attitude/discourse events versus other events—or, linguistically
put, in terms of the distinction between events as described by attitude/speech-
act/epistemic predicates versus events as described by other predicates? Are the
contents of attitude events and discourse events generally represented in the same
sort of way?
(iii) Are there interesting crosslinguistic generalizations about the sorts of pairs
of modal backgrounds that are lexicalized in attitude/speech-act predicates, and
about the relation between these lexicalized backgrounds and representations of
context and overall states of mind (e.g. desiderative/doxastic predicates with modal
backgrounds invoking all versus a particular subset of the subject’s beliefs/desires;
speech-act predicates with modal backgrounds invoking individual versus mutual
discourse commitments, or individual commitments of subject versus object)?
(iv) What is the crosslinguistic status of interpretive principles such as Maximize
Presupposition! or non-vacuity conditions such as the diversity condition on modal
bases? Are other relevant interpretive principles at play in other languages? Are
there interesting crosslinguistic relations between such principles and patterns of
optional versus obligatory indicative, or the determination of predicates’ specific
modal backgrounds?
Investigating these components and how they interact may bring into relief interesting
crosslinguistic generalizations and sources of crosslinguistic variation.
The prospects for the specific account of mood in this paper remain to be seen. I hope
our discussion has illustrated the fruitfulness of the general state-of-mind framework—
the proposed semantic approach to mood, pattern of explanation, and treatment of
27 Suggestively, and theory-ladenly, put: “Is the presupposition of [+_ind] required to be locally satisfied
(satisfied in the context representing the local state of mind)? Or required to be globally satisfied? Or is
how it is satisfied sensitive to contextual (and perhaps lexically specific) factors?”
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context and content in terms of overall states of mind—for theorizing about issues of
mood and modality.
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